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2           Abstract
Much of the philosophical engagement with the issue of paternalism, especially in the last 
couple of decades, has focused on important normative issues such as: 'what, if anything, 
is morally problematic about paternalism?', 'when is paternalism justified?', and 'how 
concerned should we be, morally speaking, with paternalism?'.
My thesis seeks to take a step back and asks a more fundamental, conceptual question, 
upon which these more practical, normative issues supervene: What precisely defines an 
act of paternalism? 
To this end, this thesis is divided into five parts; an introduction followed by four chapters. 
As well as setting out the aims of the thesis, the introduction outlines some of the basic, 
uncontroversial features of paternalism. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 then examine the rich 
philosophical literature on defining paternalism; each chapter examining a different 
approach to defining paternalism.
Through the outlining of some of the uncontroversial features of paternalism, and 
subsequent investigation of where philosophers have gone wrong in defining paternalism, I
develop seven 'Challenges' an accurate definition of paternalism must meet. I also argue 
that no definition of paternalism currently in the philosophical literature, can meet each of 
these Challenges (or even just meet Challenges 5, 6, and 7; three connected Challenges 
that are particularly important).
Finally, in Chapter 4, I present an original definition of paternalism consisting of three 
3individually necessary, and together sufficient conditions. I argue that this definition can in 
fact meet each of the seven 'Challenges'.
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6Thesis Introduction
Consider the following three cases:
CAKE
Dmitri (Y) is looking forward to getting home, opening his fridge, and eating the chocolate 
cake he bought earlier. But when he gets home, he finds that his brother Ivan (X) has 
thrown away his chocolate cake, because Ivan thinks Dmitri shouldn't eat so much 
unhealthy food.
SUICIDE
Anna (Y) has rationally chosen to commit suicide by jumping in front of a train. But her 
friend (X), despite knowing that this is a decision Anna has come to rationally, forcibly 
prevents Anna from jumping in front of the train. 
BLOOD TRANSFUSION
Rodion (Y) is ill and in hospital. He tells his doctor (X) that because of certain ethical 
beliefs, no matter what happens he does not want a blood transfusion. Despite this, when 
Rodion falls unconscious, his doctor administers a blood transfusion. The doctor acts 
because he thinks that it is for Rodion's own good.
In each of these cases X (the paternaliser) paternalises another agent, Y (the 
paternalisee).1 Much of the philosophical engagement with the issue of paternalism, 
especially in the last couple of decades, has focused on important normative issues like: 
'what, if anything, is morally problematic about paternalism?', 'when is paternalism 
1 Throughout this thesis, I will use 'X' to refer to the paternaliser/would-be paternaliser, and 'Y' to refer to 
the paternalisee/would-be paternalisee
7justified?', and 'how concerned should we be with state paternalism?'.
My thesis seeks to take a step back and asks a more fundamental, conceptual question, 
upon which these more practical, normative issues supervene: What precisely defines an 
act of paternalism? Of course, a rough and ready answer might be that X paternalises Y 
when he interferes with Y's life, against Y's will, for Y's own good. But I want to investigate 
the issue more rigorously; examining precisely what kinds of elements are necessary for 
paternalism, what kinds of attitudes, interferences and intentions characterise paternalism,
and what different forms paternalism can take.
Thesis Structure
To this end, this thesis is divided into five parts; an introduction followed by four chapters. 
As well as setting out the aims of the thesis, the introduction outlines some of the basic, 
uncontroversial features of paternalism. In particular, three features are emphasised. 
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 then examine the rich philosophical literature on defining paternalism;
each chapter examining a different approach to defining paternalism. Finally, in Chapter 4, 
I present an original definition of paternalism.2
Now there are at least two reasons why the analysis of the literature and the outlining of 
the basic features of paternalism, conducted in the introduction and first three chapters of 
2Of course, we have already noted that much of philosophical engagement with the issue of paternalism 
concerns more practical, normative questions. Yet there nonetheless exists an extensive and interesting 
philosophical literature on defining paternalism. Some philosophers dedicate entire essays to the question of 
how to define paternalism, although more commonly this question is examined as a precursor to examining 
the practical issues mentioned above. 
Either way, generally the philosopher will present a battery of cases- some supposedly uncontroversially 
cases of paternalism, others supposedly uncontroversially not cases of paternalism- before attempting to 
provide a definition of paternalism that is not only extensionally accurate with regards to these cases, but 
also furnishes us with a precise, philosophically rigorous description of the would-be paternaliser's 
engagement with the would-be paternalisee
8this thesis, are a necessary precursor to our presentation of an original definition of 
paternalism in Chapter 4. First, the analysis of the philosophical literature on defining 
paternalism provides the motivation for the presentation of a new definition of paternalism. 
For as I will argue, no definition currently featured in the literature, accurately captures 
what it means for one agent to paternalise another. And thus a new definition is called for.
Second, through outlining some of the basic features of paternalism in the introduction, 
and examining where various philosophers have gone wrong in defining paternalism in 
chapters 1, 2, and 3, I deduce a series of 'Challenges' that an accurate definition of 
paternalism must meet e.g. 'Challenge 1: an accurate definition of paternalism must reflect
how paternalism necessarily involves a benevolent motive on the part of the paternaliser, 
concerning the the paternalisee'. These 'Challenges', seven in total, guide our investigation
of paternalism, and ultimately the construction of a new definition of paternalism in Chapter
4.
Thesis Motivation
I now want to say a few words regarding the motivation for writing a thesis on defining 
paternalism. In particular I highlight three motivating factors.
First, I take 'paternalism' to be an intrinsically interesting concept, worthy of philosophical 
study and clarification. In this sense, paternalism may be taken as similar to concepts like 
'coercion' and 'freedom', which have rich philosophical literatures dedicated to simply 
clarifying the meaning of these concepts. What makes paternalism so interesting? 
Perhaps the most obvious answer, is the way paternalism combines conflicting morally 
9relevant features. As I will argue in this thesis, when X paternalises Y,  he interferes with 
Y's life (in a way that will be clarified) while disregarding Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes concerning what is in his own best interests. Such aspects are at least 
prima facie morally problematic. But he does so in order to promote Y's good. Because he 
has Y's best interests at heart. This paints the picture of a conflicted, morally complicated 
concept.
Second, I take the rich philosophical literature on defining paternalism to be itself 
something worthy of study. Within this literature, philosophers like Gerald Dworkin, Joel 
Feinberg, Richard Arneson, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, offer competing 
characterisations of paternalism based on an analysis of a battery of cases. I take it to be 
a philosophically interesting issue whether any of these philosophers are successful, and if
none are (which is the conclusion I ultimately argue in favour of), where precisely these 
philosophers went wrong, and whether we can go one better and offer a satisfying 
definition of paternalism ourselves.
Third and finally, as noted at the very beginning of this introduction, there are several 
important normative questions regarding paternalism; questions such as 'what is (morally) 
problematic about paternalism?', 'when is paternalism justified?'. But I take it that how we 
answer the conceptual question this thesis investigates (i.e. what precisely defines 
paternalism?), crucially informs the investigation of these more practical, normative 
questions. 
After all, what kind of moral problem paternalism poses, can plausibly be viewed as the 
product of on the one hand, what (morally relevant) features necessarily make up an act of
10
paternalism, and on the other hand, what different forms paternalism can take. And 
deciding what morally relevant features necessarily make up an act of paternalism and 
what forms paternalism can take, plausibly requires defining paternalism.
What's more, in this thesis I argue that even the most well respected and widely accepted 
definitions of paternalism, upon which we often find the normative analysis of paternalism 
based, are guilty of distorting the concept in various, normatively significant ways. For 
instance, Dworkin's 1983 and 2014 definitions of paternalism are two of the most widely 
accepted definitions in the philosophical literature. And it is unsurprising to find many 
philosophers base their normative analysis of paternalism upon these definitions.3 
But in several ways we will investigate in more detail later, Dworkin's accounts are 
problematic. Take Dworkin's suggestion that paternalist acts necessarily interfere with Y's 
autonomy or liberty. In Chapter 2 I dispute this claim. If I am right, then this has 
consequences for the normative question. For if paternalism really does necessarily 
involve an interference with Y's autonomy or liberty, this gives us an important moral 
reason to avoid paternalism. But if paternalism need not involve an interference with Y's 
autonomy or liberty, perhaps there are forms of paternalism that are not so morally 
problematic.
I thus find myself sympathetic to Louis Groarke's suggestion that:
“If we hope to avoid wildly inaccurate conclusions, it behooves us to base our 
analysis of paternalism on genuine rather than specious examples of 
3James and Morden (1988), Wilson (2011), Bergelson (2009), Perez (2008), Uhl (2011) to name a couple of 
examples
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paternalistic intervention” 4
Now recently Kalle Grill (2015) has cast doubt on whether answering the conceptual 
question (i.e. what precisely defines an act of paternalism?) really is so important for 
investigating the normative questions surrounding paternalism (i.e. what is morally 
problematic about paternalism?, when can paternalism be morally justified?). 
Grill suggests that an effective way to investigate the normative questions surrounding 
paternalism, is to analyse the claims of the anti-paternalist. And the best way to interpret 
the anti-paternalist's claims, he convincingly argues, is as a special claim about the 
function of reasons in different contexts. Specifically, the claim that a benevolent motive 
regarding Y (the motivation involved in paternalism), does not count as a reason in favour 
of, or justification for, whatever else paternalism involves (e.g. interfering with Y's life in 
some way, perhaps acting contrary to Y's relevantly informed will, perhaps interfering with 
Y's voluntary conduct). 
Why should we think that this shows the normative debate about paternalism can be 
addressed without entering into the conceptual debate? Grill's argument seems to be that, 
on this analysis of anti-paternalism, the precise details of what paternalism involves are 
not so important. For whatever features make up an act of paternalism apart from a 
benevolent motive regarding Y- be it an interference with Y's autonomy, or an interference 
with Y's actions, or an action that is known to be contrary to Y's wishes, or something else 
entirely- the anti-paternalist's critique of paternalism is going to be the same: That these 
things are not justified by the goal of promoting Y's good.
4Groarke (2002, p205)
12
But while I take Grill's argument to be a shrewd analysis of the structure of the anti-
paternalist's claims, I dispute whether it really, without being supplemented by an answer 
to the conceptual question, answers the normative questions paternalism raises. For it 
stands to reason that if we want to answer the normative questions that surround 
paternalism, we need to know more than the structure of the anti-paternalist's claim (i.e. 
that a benevolent motive regarding Y does not justify whatever else is involved in 
paternalism). We need to assess whether this claim is justified, or not. And assessing 
whether the anti-paternalist's claim is justified, plausibly requires that we isolate precisely 
what kind of features make up a paternalist act other than a benevolent motive; before 
investigating whether these features really are not justified by a benevolent motive. In 
other words, we still need an answer to the conceptual question.
Paternalism: three uncontroversial features
I want to end this introduction by drawing out three general, uncontroversial features of 
paternalism that virtually all philosophers agree upon. This will help clarify the concept a 
little, as well as lay the groundwork for the rest of the thesis. 
i) a benevolent motive
First, it is widely accepted within the philosophical literature that paternalism necessarily 
involves a benevolent motive on X's part regarding Y. That is to say, it is widely accepted 
than an accurate definition of paternalism must feature what we might call a benevolence 
condition.
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Of course, there are different ways of characterising a benevolent motive. Indeed, later I 
will argue that many philosophers actually fail to characterise a benevolent motive 
accurately. But the point remains that virtually all philosophers agree that paternalism 
necessarily involves a benevolent motive, although they may disagree on the precise 
details of what that is. Thus, Gerald Dworkin (2014) writes that paternalism involves X 
acting only because he believes his actions: “will improve the welfare of Y (where this 
includes preventing his welfare from diminishing), or in some way promote the interests, 
values, or good of Y”. Danny Scoccia demands that in order to paternalise Y, X must act 
out of a “beneficent concern for Y's welfare”.5 Simon Clarke states that X acts 
paternalistically towards Y only “to the extent that X does so in order to promote Y's 
good”.6 While Gert and Culver's definition of paternalism requires that X believes “that his 
action is for Y's good”.7
Before we move on, it should be noted that while it is very widely accepted within the 
philosophical literature that paternalism involves a benevolent motive on X's part regarding
Y, this acceptance is not quite unanimous. In particular Seana Shiffrin (2000) has forcefully
argued that rather than endorsing a benevolence condition, we should instead endorse 
what I will refer to as a superciliousness condition. More precisely Shiffrin claims that a 
necessary condition of paternalism, should simply be that X's actions are motivated by: X's
belief that his judgement or agency regarding some interest or matter that legitimately lies 
within Y’s control, is superior in some respect to Y's judgement or agency regarding said 
interest or matter. 
The superciliousness condition is importantly broader than the benevolence condition. As 
5Scoccia (2008, p2), 'their' changed to 'Y's'
6Clarke (2002, p82)
7Gert and Culver (1979, p199), changed subjects. 'S' changed to 'Y'
14
Shiffrin points out, whenever X meets the benevolence condition, he will necessarily also 
meet the superciliousness condition. After all, if X believes he knows better than Y how to 
promote Y's good, he surely counts as believing his judgement/agency to be superior to 
Y's regarding some interest that lies within Y's legitimate control. By contrast, X can meet 
the superciliousness condition without also meeting the benevolence condition; for 
instance, when X interferes with Y's life just because he is annoyed at watching Y fail, and 
thinks he could do better.
Shiffrin argues in favour of the superciliousness condition over the traditional benevolence 
condition, on the following grounds: That cases where X interferes with Y's life and meets 
the superciliousness condition, are relevantly similar normatively speaking, to cases where
X interferes with Y's life and meets the benevolence condition. This is (allegedly) 
evidenced by the fact we have relevantly similar normative reactions to both types of 
case.8 Coupled with the assumption that our classification of whether a given case counts 
as paternalist should depend on the normative significance of those cases9, Shiffrin 
concludes that if we think that X paternalises Y when X interferes with Y's life and meets 
the benevolence condition, we should also think that X paternalises Y whenever X 
interferes with Y's life and meets the superciliousness condition.
The key problem with Shiffrin's argument, is that it is far from clear whether these two 
types of case really are necessarily normatively similar. Consider how, when X interferes 
with Y while also meeting the benevolence condition, X necessarily interferes with Y for 
Y's own good. This is a necessary feature of such cases. However, when X interferes with 
Y and meets the superciliousness condition, X need not interfere with Y for Y's own good 
(although he might). For instance, X might simply interfere with Y because he wants to 
8Shiffrin (2002, p218)
9Shiffrin (2002, p212)
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protect Z, whom Y is supposed to be (but is failing in) protecting. 
Contra Shiffrin, this points to a significant moral difference between cases where X 
interferes with Y and meets the benevolence condition, and cases where X interferes with 
Y and meets the superciliousness condition. When X interferes with Y in order to protect Z,
his interference can be (at least prima facie) morally justified by appealing to the harm 
principle. Yet no such appeal can ever be made in the case where X interferes with Y for 
Y's own good (when X interferes with Y and meets the benevolence condition). 
Actually, the issue cuts both ways. For X can also meet the superciliousness condition (but
not the benevolence condition), by interfering with Y merely because he is personally tired 
of seeing Y fail in some matter Y has legitimate control of. For instance, X might prevent Y 
from being able to cook his own food because X is sick of watching Y make such a bad job
of it. Or, to take one of Shiffrin's examples, X might talk over Y while Y is trying to express 
a point, because X thinks he can express the point so much more clearly. Interfering with Y
in this way (because one simply wants to, and with no regard for Y's own good), is very 
different, morally speaking, to interfering with Y for his own sake, as X necessarily does 
when he meets the benevolence condition. 
The issue can be expressed in terms of appreciating the moral significance of the 
separateness of persons.10 In the former case, X's actions can be (at least prima facie) 
morally justified to Y. Why? Because although X imposes some sacrifice on Y, Y stands to 
gain from this sacrifice. In the latter case however, no such justification can be provided; 
for X imposes a sacrifice on Y so that some other agent can gain. Appreciating the 
difference between these cases amounts to appreciating that there is a (at least prima 
10See Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009, p179)
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facie) moral difference between making Y suffer for his own sake, and making Y suffer for 
someone else's sake. That there is a certain moral difference between the intrapersonal 
case and the interpersonal case. If Shiffrin's account cannot reflect this moral difference, 
then so much the worse for Shiffrin.
With Shiffrin's objection replied to, let us say that the first 'Challenge' an accurate definition
of paternalism must meet, is as follows
Challenge 1
To reflect that paternalism necessarily involves a benevolent motive on X's part 
regarding Y.
ii) voluntariness
The second uncontroversial feature of paternalism is a little more complicated. It relates to 
a distinction often drawn in the literature that Joel Feinberg describes as of the “first 
importance”11. The distinction between hard paternalism and soft paternalism. When 
philosophers talk about paternalism (and I have been no different in this respect), what 
they are usually actually talking about is 'hard paternalism'. Hard paternalism (or just plain 
'paternalism') is standardly taken to involve, in some rough and ready way that this thesis 
aims to clarify, a benevolent interference with Y's voluntary conduct. Soft paternalism, by 
contrast consists in X benevolently interfering with Y, but not aiming to interfere with Y's 
voluntary conduct.12 
Along these lines, it is commonly assumed that an accurate definition of paternalism (that 
11Feinberg (1986, p12)
12See Grill (2011)
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is, hard paternalism) must discount two different types of cases that qualify as merely soft 
paternalism. First, cases like BRIDGE where X merely aims to benevolently interfere with 
Y's non-voluntary conduct. Second, cases like ONCOMING TRAFFIC where X 
benevolently interferes with Y, merely in order to ascertain if Y is acting voluntarily or not.13
BRIDGE
Y is about to step onto a bridge. Little does he know, the bridge is broken, and thus will 
collapse and kill him if and when he steps onto it. By contrast, X knows that the bridge is 
broken. X sees Y walking towards the bridge, and working on the assumption that Y is 
unaware that the bridge is about to collapse, X decides to forcibly prevent Y from stepping 
onto the bridge, say by tackling him to the ground before he gets to the bridge.
ONCOMING TRAFFIC
Y is about to cross the road and step into oncoming traffic. X sees this, but in unsure 
whether Y is acting involuntarily or not. After all, Y might be attempting to deliberately end 
his own life, or he may simply crossing the road absent-mindedly. X decides to forcibly 
prevent Y from crossing the road so he can quickly ascertain whether Y is acting 
voluntarily or not. If it turns out that Y is acting voluntarily, X will not stand in his way.
In light of this, it is tempting to say that the second Challenge an accurate definition of 
paternalism must meet, is to reflect that (hard) paternalism necessarily involves X 
interfering with aspects of Y's life that are voluntary. Actually, later on in Chapter 4 I will 
argue that this principle is incorrect. Still, I agree that X does not paternalise Y in cases like
BRIDGE or ONCOMING TRAFFIC. Thus, let us simply install the following as the second 
Challenge an accurate definition must meet:
13Ibid
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Challenge 2
That X does not paternalise Y in cases like BRIDGE where X interferes with Y 
merely because he believes Y is acting involuntarily. Nor in cases like ONCOMING 
TRAFFIC where X interferes with Y merely in order to ascertain if he is acting 
voluntarily or not.
Before we move on to the third uncontroversial feature of paternalism, I want to head off 
an objection. It may follow from what we have just said, that a father (X) does not (hard) 
paternalise his young son (Y), when he benevolently interferes with the young son's 
actions against the son's will e.g. by banning the son from playing his Playstation before 
he has done all his homework. After all, depending on how young the son is, his 
decision/desire to play on his Playstation may not count as sufficiently voluntary. 
Some philosophers object to this conclusion. Gert and Culver (1979) point out that the 
concept of (hard) paternalism derives from how a parent treats their young child when they
benevolently interfere with the young child's life/actions/decisions/etc. From this they infer 
that it is “paradoxical” to suggest that such a case is not a case of (hard) paternalism.14 
But Gert and Culver's argument is flawed. The concept of (hard) paternalism may indeed 
derive from how a parent treats their young children. Yet this is not because the latter is an
example of the former. Rather, it is because, as Feinberg (1986) suggests, to label X's 
treatment of Y as (hard) paternalist is to draw a certain analogy. It is to claim that X is 
treating Y, as a parent typically treats their young child.15 
14Gert and Culver (1976, p54)
15Feinberg (1986, p23)
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This furnishes us with an explanation of how the concept of hard paternalism relates to the
parent/young child case, without assuming that the parent necessarily (hard) paternalises 
the young child in the parent/child case.
iii) rational persuasion 
The third and final uncontroversial feature of paternalism I want to draw attention to, is how
X does not paternalise Y when he merely engages Y in rational persuasion.16 It follows 
from this, that had X merely tried to rationally persuade Y not to eat so much cake in 
CAKE, or merely tried to rationally persuade Y against jumping on the train tracks in 
SUICIDE, then X would not have paternalised Y in these cases. Along these lines, let us 
make the following the third Challenge an accurate definition of paternalism must meet.
Challenge 3
To reflect that X does not paternalise Y (even when all other conditions are met) 
when he merely aims to engage Y in rational persuasion. 
At this point, we must be careful here not to conflate rational persuasion with the 
presentation of argument. For the essence of mere rational persuasion, and the reason 
that it precludes paternalism, is that mere rational persuasion does not interfere with Y in 
any significant sense. But sometimes X can present an argument to Y, while interfering 
with Y. Consider, for instance, the case where X deploys highly rhetorical devices, such as 
powerful emotional appeals. Similarly, consider the case where X persists with the 
presentation of argument against Y's will, knowing that Y does not want to hear any such 
arguments. In such cases X may well present an argument to Y, but his actions go beyond 
16See Scoccia (2008)
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merely presenting Y with the facts.
Of course, we do not want to equate rational persuasion with nothing but the dry 
presentation of logical argument either. Very few discussions or arguments consist in 
nothing but logical, rational appeal, and so demanding that rational persuasion be so 
austere a concept would be implausible. Instead, the rather more subtle point is that 
sometimes X can make an argument too forcefully, or depend too much on emotional 
manipulation; and in such cases X's actions go beyond the limits of mere rational 
persuasion.
Conclusion
With these three points clear, and their corresponding Challenges outlined, let us now 
move to Chapter 1. There we will examine two of the more straightforward, perhaps more 
commonsensical approaches to defining paternalism. 
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Chapter 1: an examination of those more minimalist, straightforward 
definitions of paternalism
Introduction
In the introduction to this thesis, we looked at three uncontroversial, general features of 
paternalism. We said that an accurate definition of paternalism must reflect each of these 
features, and so an accurate definition must at least meet the following three Challenges:17
Challenge 1
To reflect that paternalism necessarily involves a benevolent motive on X's part 
regarding Y.
Challenge 2
To reflect that paternalism involves X aiming to interfere with aspects of Y's life that 
are voluntary. And that as such X does not paternalise Y in cases like BRIDGE or 
ONCOMING TRAFFIC.
Challenge 3
To reflect that X does not paternalise Y (even when all other conditions are met) 
when he merely aims to engage Y in rational persuasion. 
What's more, we said that throughout this thesis, as we learn more about the nature of 
paternalism, we will develop new Challenges. Indeed, by the end of this chapter we will 
have isolated seven Challenges an accurate definition of paternalism must meet. These 
seven Challenges will guide the rest of our investigation of paternalism.
17As in the introduction 'X' will stand for the paternaliser/would-be paternaliser. While 'Y' will stand for 
the paternalisee/would-be paternalisee
22
But identifying new Challenges is not the central aim of this chapter. Rather, I want to take 
a closer look at some of the more minimalist, more straightforward, perhaps more 
commonsensical ways paternalism has been defined in the literature. And whether any of 
these more minimalist, straightforward definitions can meet the Challenges an accurate 
definition of paternalism must meet.
Along these lines, I divide those more minimalist, straightforward definitions of paternalism 
into two groups. On the one hand those definitions that conceptualise paternalist acts as 
benevolent interferences that are simply contrary to Y's wishes/desires/what Y has 
consented to. And on the other hand, those definitions that conceptualise paternalist acts 
as benevolent interference that violate Y's liberty. 
Ultimately I suggest that both types of minimalist, straightforward definition are 
problematic, and that therefore we should turn to examining some of the more 
complicated, more nuanced definitions of paternalism in the literature.
Part 1: Minimalist definitions that emphasise paternalist interferences as  benevolent acts 
that are contrary to Y's wishes/desires/what Y has consented to
Let's start by taking a look at those more minimalist definitions in the literature that 
conceptualise acts of paternalism as benevolently motivated acts that are contrary to Y's 
wishes/desires/what Y has consented to. In particular I want to look at the definitions of 
paternalism offered by Peter Suber, Dan Brock, Donald VanDeVeer, and finally Paul 
Hershey.
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As we saw in the introduction to this thesis, it is uncontroversial enough to suppose that 
paternalism necessarily involves a benevolent motive on X's part. But what about the 
notion that the only additional aspect to a paternalist act, is that X acts in a way that is 
contrary to Y's wishes/desires/what Y has consented to? Can this general idea be cashed-
out so as to produce a plausible definition of paternalism?
I highlight two potential problems for this kind of minimalist definition of paternalism. These
two problems will lead me to introduce two new challenges; Challenge 4 and Challenge 5. 
But while I argue that this type of minimalist definition may be able to meet Challenge 4, I 
submit that Challenge 5 presents a more enduring problem.
i) Challenge 4
Peter Suber
Let's start by looking at Peter Suber's definition of paternalism. Suber argues that to 
paternalise someone, “is to act for the good of another person without that person's 
consent”.18 This definition adequately deals with at least some of the cases of paternalism 
we have looked at in this thesis. For instance, it explains why X paternalises Y in cases 
like SUICIDE, CAKE and BLOOD TRANSFUSION. For in each of these cases, X 
benevolently acts without Y's consent; in SUICIDE X stops Y from jumping on the train 
tracks without Y's consent. In CAKE X has not obtained Y's consent when he throws away 
Y's cake. While in BLOOD TRANSFUSION Y is incapacitated and so cannot consent to 
X's administering a blood transfusion, nor has Y given his consent in the past.
18Suber (1999), my emphasis
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Yet a closer look at Suber's definition reveals it to be too broad. Consider the following 
case we might call BEE.
BEE
X and Y are in the park. A bee flies on Y's back with the seeming intent to sting Y. Y does 
not seem to notice the bee, but X does. Assuming that Y would not want to be stung if he 
knew there was a bee around, X decides to push Y to one side and swat away the bee. X 
acts without Y's consent for he believes there is no time to waste.
I take it as clear that X does not paternalise Y in BEE. We will explore a precise answer to 
this question later in this thesis. But to pre-empt our answer a little, the answer relates to 
how X is acting in a way he believes Y approves of, or at least would approve of if he was 
relevantly informed. As such, X is not trying to paternalistically ride roughshod over Y's 
judgement regarding his own interests. Or paternalistically substitute out Y's judgement or 
wishes regarding what is in Y's best interests, and substitute in his own. Rather, X has 
taken into consideration what Y's relevantly informed wishes are/would be, and is ensuring
this guides his interaction with Y. In this sense, BEE is relevantly similar to CIGARETTES.
CIGARETTES
Y wants to finally quit smoking. To this end, Y asks his friend X to come to his house, and 
throw away all his cigarettes. X is happy to oblige as he thinks quitting smoking will do Y 
the world of good.
The problem is that Suber's definition fails to reflect this point about approval. The fact that
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X has thought about what Y's wishes are or would be if he was relevantly informed, and 
believes his actions to be in line with these wishes, is not a relevant consideration on his 
account. Rather, all that matters is that benevolently motivated X acts without Y's consent. 
As such, Suber's account delivers the (implausible) verdict that X paternalises Y in BEE 
and CIGARETTES.
This point about how X does not paternalise Y in cases like BEE and CIGARETTES can 
be expressed in the form of a Challenge. A Challenge that Suber's definition fails to meet.
           Challenge 4
To reflect that X does not paternalise Y in cases like BEE and CIGARETTES where 
X has considered what relevantly informed Y (would) approve of, and merely aims 
to act in a way he believes relevantly informed Y does/would approve of.
Dan Brock
Perhaps in light of the problems we have seen with Suber's account, it is best to drop talk 
of consent. Along these lines, Dan Brock defines paternalism as follows:
“paternalism is action by one person [X] for another's [Y's] good, but contrary to their [Y's] 
present wishes or desires” 19
But it is unclear whether Brock's account, and in particular his focus on Y's present  wishes
and desires can reflect that X does not paternalise Y in BEE. After all, X may well think that
Y will approve once he finds our why X is pushing him aside. But at the time X pushes Y 
19Brock, (1983, p238) my emphasis
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aside, Y presumably objects to X's behaviour. That is, X acts in a way that is contrary to 
Y's present wishes or desires.
Donald VanDeVeer
It is with this kind of problem in mind that Donald VanDeVeer offers his definition of 
paternalism. According to VanDeVeer, X paternalises Y IFF:
“1. X deliberately does (or omits) his action
2. X believes that his doing (or omitting) his action is contrary to Y's operative preference, 
intention or disposition at the time X does (or omits) his actions (or when X's actions 
affects Y)
3. X acts (or omits to act a certain way) with the primary or sole aim of promoting a benefit 
for Y [a benefit which, X believes, would not accrue to Y in the absence of X’s doing (or 
omitting) his action, or preventing a harm to Y, a harm which, X believes, would accrue to 
Y in the absence of X’s doing (or omitting) X” 20
What is particularly interesting about VanDeVeer's definition, is the way it asks us to look 
not only at whether X acts contrary to Y's current wishes/preferences, but also whether X 
acts contrary to Y's disposition. Unfortunately, despite this, VanDeVeer's definition still 
incorrectly labels BEE as a case of paternalism. For VanDeVeer's second condition states 
that X must act contrary to Y's operative preferences or Y's disposition at the time. Such a 
disjunctive condition is met, even when only one of its disjuncts is satisfied. And as X acts 
contrary to Y's operative preferences in BEE, X's actions meet this second condition, and 
so are (implausibly) counted as potentially paternalist according to VanDeVeer's definition.
20VanDeVeer (1986, p22), changed subjects, my emphasis
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However, what if we take VanDeVeer's second condition, and focus only on Y's 
disposition? What if we demand simply that benevolently motivated X must act contrary to 
Y's disposition at the time, in order to paternalise Y? This modified version of VanDeVeer's 
second condition would explain why X does not paternalise Y in BEE. For in this case, 
there is an important sense in which X acts in line with Y's disposition at the time. For 
presumably Y has a disposition such that he does not want to be stung by a 
bee/experience needless pain. As such, X actually acts in line with Y's dispositional 
desires in BEE. 
Yet I suggest that this account too is flawed. For consider a case where X interferes with 
Y's life in a way he believes Y will object to/not approve of when Y finds out, but where Y 
also has no relevant dispositional desires at the time of X's interference.
SAVINGS ACCOUNT
X surreptitiously sets up a savings account in Y's name. For the sake of argument we can 
say that Y has never considered the possibility of having a savings account and so has no 
relevant wishes or desires on the matter. But X does believe that were Y to be confronted 
with the possibility of having a savings account, he would unwisely decline. 
X's actions are clearly paternalist in this case. Yet X neither acts contrary to Y's actual 
desires/wishes/preferences at the time, nor Y's dispositional desires/wishes/preferences. 
After all, how can Y be said to have dispositional desires regarding whether to set up a 
savings account, if Y has never even heard of the concept? As such, our account would 
incorrectly discount X's actions as paternalist in SAVINGS ACCOUNT.
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Paul Hershey
All in all, I think the best way to meet Challenge 4 while also explaining why X does not 
paternalise Y in SAVINGS ACCOUNT, is to emphasise the idea of paternalism involving a 
disregard for Y's wishes and desires on X's part. I will not offer a full explanation here,21 
but Paul Hershey captures the basic idea. According to Hershey, X paternalises Y just so 
long as: 
“(1) the paternalistic action is primarily intended to benefit the recipient [Y], and (2) the 
recipient's [Y's] consent or dissent is not a relevant consideration for the initiator [X]” 22
Hershey's definition correctly discounts X's actions from being paternalist in BEE and 
CIGARETTES. For in this case, Y's dissent is a relevant consideration for X; it's just that X 
thinks relevantly informed Y would not dissent. What is more, it also correctly labels X's 
actions as paternalist in SAVINGS ACCOUNT; as in this case the fact that relevantly 
informed Y would not consent and would dissent to X's actions, clearly is of no concern to 
X. 
ii) Challenge 5
However, there is a problem with Hershey's definition. A problem that also applies to all 
those minimalist, straightforward definitions of paternalism that emphasise acts of 
paternalism as merely benevolent acts that are contrary to Y's wishes/desires/what Y has 
consented to.
21This will come in Chapter 4
22Hershey (1985)
29
It is common for philosophers to suppose that paternalism necessarily involves some kind 
of 'interference' with Y's life. A corollary of this, is that when X interacts with Y's life in a 
way that does not 'interfere' (whatever this means) with Y's life in any significant way, then 
X does not paternalise Y. Thus, consider LAWYER; a case presented by Gerald Dworkin in
his highly influential 1983 essay 'Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts':
“Consider a father [Y] who wants his daughter [X] to become a lawyer. The daughter [X] 
believes that she would make a very good lawyer. Indeed, she believes it likely that she 
would be more successful professionally than her father [Y], who has managed to survive 
only on a marginal basis. Because she believes that such success would make her father 
[Y] very unhappy, the daughter [X] decides to become a doctor instead...Yet I think that 
this is not a case of paternalism.” 23
According to Dworkin's influential analysis, which I agree with, X (the daughter) does not 
paternalise Y (the father) in LAWYER, because X's actions do not interfere with Y in the 
way necessary for paternalism.24 After all, when we recall the cases of paternalism we 
have examined in this chapter (e.g. CAKE, SUICIDE, BLOOD TRANSFUSION), X seems 
to interfere with Y's life in quite substantial ways; violating Y's liberty, or at least restricting 
Y's actions. By contrast in LAWYER, X merely seems to act contrary to Y's wishes, without
really interfering with his life. 
Now note that each of the more minimalist, straightforward definitions of paternalism we 
have seen in this chapter, license the opposite verdict on LAWYER. For these definitions 
23Dworkin, (1983, p106). I have inserted Xs and Ys to make clear that it is the daughter, not the father,  
   who is the potential paternalizer
24We will examine Dworkin's precise reasoning in the next chapter
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impose no requirement that benevolently motivated X must 'interfere' with Y's life in some 
significant way. They require simply that X acts in a way that relevantly informed Y does 
not/would not like. 
To recall Suber's definition of paternalism, the daughter acts without the father's consent. 
To recall Brock and VanDeVeer's definitions, the daughter acts contrary to father's wishes 
and desires (he wishes for her to go into law). To recall Hershey's definition, the daughter 
acts in a way that she knows the father will not like but acts in this way anyway. As such, 
each of these definitions (implausibly) implies that X paternalises Y in LAWYER.
This problem would be somewhat minimised if LAWYER was a one-off, anomalous case. 
Yet there are many others that share the same basic structure; cases where benevolently 
motivated X acts in a way relevantly informed Y does not like, but where X's actions do not
paternalise Y because (in some rough and ready sense) they do not interfere with him. 
Take for example, POSITIVE THOUGHTS.
POSITIVE THOUGHTS
Y has an interview for a big promotion later today. In order to give Y a little bit of extra luck,
X decides to 'send out good thoughts to the universe on Y's behalf' and maybe say a little 
prater for Y, even though X knows Y has a preference that X not do so.25
Or consider the following case presented by Simon Clarke:26
ROSES
X grows roses in his garden, close to where his neighbour's garden starts. X does so in an
25This is a modified version of a case suggested to me by Dr James Wilson in private discussion, 2015
26Clarke (2002, p90)
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attempt to benefit Y. After all, it nice to be able to look out of one's window and see 
beautiful roses. X knows Y has a preference that he not do so.
In all these cases X's actions seem to be discounted by how, whatever else is happening, 
X does not aim to interfere with Y's life in any significant way. Along these lines, let us say 
that Challenge 5 that an accurate definition must meet (a Challenge that those more 
minimalist definitions of paternalism that characterise paternalist acts as benevolent acts 
by X that relevantly informed Y does not like, fail to meet), is as follows:
Challenge 5
To reflect that, in some rough and ready way in need of clarification, paternalism 
requires that X aims to 'interfere with Y's life in some significant way'. As such, X 
does not paternalise Y in cases like ROSES, POSITIVE THOUGHTS, and 
LAWYER, where X does not aim to interfere with Y's life in a significant way.
Part 2: Minimalist definitions that emphasise paternalist interferences as benevolently 
motivated coercive, or liberty-limiting actions
There is, however, a different kind of intuitive, minimalist definition of paternalism. 
Specifically, those definitions that characterise paternalist interferences as benevolent 
violations of Y's liberty or benevolent rights-violations.
Arneson, Pope, Valdés
Consider, for instance, Richard Arneson's definition of paternalist acts as: “restrictions on a
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person's (Y's) liberty which are justified exclusively by consideration for that person's (Y's) 
own good or welfare, and which are carried out either against his present will (when his 
present will is not explicitly overridden by his own prior commitment) or against his prior 
commitment”.27 Or consider the definition of paternalism offered by Thaddeus Pope, that 
restricts paternalist acts to acts where benevolently motivated X intentionally limits Y's 
liberty.28 While Ernesto Garzón Valdés29 characterises paternalist interferences as 
benevolently motivated 'coercive interventions'. 30
These accounts of paternalism seem to deal well enough with the kinds of cases of 
paternalism we examined in the introduction to this thesis (i.e. CAKE, SUICIDE, and 
BLOOD TRANSFUSION). For in each of these cases benevolently motivated X violates 
Y's liberty; in CAKE X violates Y's liberty by destroying his property (Y's cake), in BLOOD 
TRANSFUSION, X coerces Y's by interfering with unconscious Y's body without his 
consent, while in SUICIDE X coerces Y by forcibly preventing Y from jumping on the train 
tracks. 
But what about Challenge 5? Can this second type of minimalist definition of paternalism 
explain why in cases like LAWYER, ROSES and POSITIVE THOUGHTS, X's actions do 
not seem to interfere with Y's life in the kind of way required for paternalism? The answer 
is yes. For this second type of minimalist definition makes it a necessary condition of 
paternalism that X interferes with Y's life qua violating Y's liberty. And in each of the three 
cases mentioned in Challenge 5, X does not violate Y's liberty. After all, in LAWYER Y (the 
father) may prefer that X (the daughter) go into law, but her not going into law hardly 
27Arneson (1980, p471). Again I have added Xs and Ys
28Pope (2004)
29Valdés (1990)
30Or as Valdés puts it two years earlier in a 1988 essay, paternalism consists in “la intervención coactive
en el comportamiento de una persona a fin de evitar que se dañe a sí misma”. “The coercive intervention 
with the behaviour of a person [Y] to the end of preventing harm to that person” (p155, my translation)
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violates his liberty. Similarly, in ROSES X may provide Y with the additional option of being
able to look at a bed of roses, but this does not violate Y's liberty. While in POSITIVE 
THOUGHTS, Y may prefer that X not pray on his behalf, but X's silent prayer does not 
coerce Y or undermine his liberty.
Have we already found then, the accurate definition of paternalism we are looking for? I 
suggest not. For I want to propose two more Challenges an accurate definition must meet. 
Not only will these be the final Challenges I will outline in this thesis, I argue that the 
second kind of minimalist, straightforward definition of paternalism we are looking at, 
meets neither Challenge. 
Recall that according to Challenge 5, an accurate definition of paternalism must reflect that
paternalism involves X aiming to interfere with Y's life in some kind of significant way. With 
this in mind, I want to dedicate Challenges 6 and 7 to reflecting all the various ways X can 
count as interfering with Y's life. However, I want to keep the form of interference with Y's 
life known as paternalist 'nudges' and 'shoves', separate from all other forms of 
interference. This is for the sake of clarity, and because 'nudges'/'shoves' constitute a 
different kind of paternalist interference with Y. Thus, let us say that Challenge 6 requires 
reflecting- leaving aside the issue of so called paternalist 'nudges' and 'shoves'- all the 
ways in which X can count as 'interfering with Y's life'.31 While Challenge 7 involves 
reflecting how X can 'interfere with Y's life, simply by 'nudging' or 'shoving' Y. 
i) Challenge 6
31Here I keep the issue of paternalist 'nudges' and 'shoves' separate from all other types of paternalist 
interference with Y's life. This is because, as we will see later on in this thesis, paternalist 'nudges' and 
'shoves' interfere with Y's life in a special, different kind of way
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Challenge 6 immediately poses a problem for the second kind of more minimalist, 
straightforward definition of paternalism. For even leaving aside the issue of 
'nudging'/'shoving, there are many ways in which X can interfere with Y's life such that his 
actions are potentially paternalist, without X violating Y's liberty. Thus, consider PILLS; a 
case offered by Dworkin in 'Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts'.
PILLS
A husband, knowing his wife to be suicidal (let's say rationally suicidal so as to make it 
clear the husband's behaviour is hard paternalist, not soft), decides to hide his sleeping 
pills in order to thwart his wife's attempts to kill herself.32 
Or consider PROFESSOR, another case of Dworkin's.
PROFESSOR
A professor (X) refuses to recommend her PhD student (Y) to a certain university, because
she (X) is worried the student will be out of his league, and will therefore struggle and be 
unhappy.33 
Finally, consider DEATHBED.
DEATHBED
Y is on his deathbed. Y asks X how his family are. X lies to Y, telling Y that Y's family are 
all fine, even though the truth is that they were all just murdered. X lies so as to soothe Y 
in his dying moments, even though X knows Y wants to know the truth. 
32p106
33Ibid
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In all three of these cases, X paternalises Y without coercing Y or interfering with Y's 
liberty. In PILLS X merely hides his pills from his wife. As Dworkin points out, this is not an 
infringement of Y's liberty as the concept is normally construed, as they are X's pills and 
he can put them wherever he wants. In PROFESSOR, X may well prevent Y from going to 
a certain university, but this hardly coerces Y/violates his liberty. While in DEATHBED X 
simply deceives Y, which does not obviously result in Y's liberty being violated.
Thus, while it still seems fair to say that paternalism involves X interfering with Y's life in 
some significant way (see Challenge 5), we should reject the idea that paternalism 
necessarily involves X violating Y's liberty. Rather, what we need is an account of 
paternalism that can reflect all the types of interference with Y's life through which X can 
paternalise Y e.g. through violating Y's liberty, through deception, through preventing Y 
from acting in certain ways (this list will grow larger throughout this thesis). Again, we can 
put this in the form of a Challenge.
Challenge 6
Following on from Challenge 5, to reflect the wide variety of interferences with Y's 
life ('nudges' and 'shoves' aside) through which X canpaternalise Y. e.g.through 
violating Y's liberty, through controlling what actions Y can do, through deception, 
etc.
ii) 'nudges' and 'shoves' and Challenge 7
What about Challenge 7? Challenge 7 involves reflecting how X can interfere with Y's life 
such that his actions are potentially paternalist, simply by 'nudging' or 'shoving' Y. Now the 
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related concepts of 'nudging' and 'shoving' were thrust into academic and public 
consciousness by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein's groundbreaking 2008 work 'Nudge:
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness'. But what do we mean when 
we talk of 'nudging' and 'shoving'?
And as one might expect philosophers have interpreted the related two concepts in subtly 
different ways. As I will understand the terms, to 'nudge' Y, is to deliberately affect, through 
means other than rational persuasion, a choice of Y's, without closing any of Y's options or
forcing any option upon Y. Or even exerting significant decisional pressure on Y's 
choice(s).34 Something exerts non-significant decisional pressure, when whatever 
influence on Y's choices that thing exerts, can be potentially easily outweighed or 
neutralised by other factors (e.g. conflicting preferences). Thus, a typical example of a 
paternalist nudge might be SHOPKEEPER. 
'Shoves' meanwhile also affect (through means other than rational persuasion) what 
choice(s) Y makes without closing Y's options or forcing any option upon Y. But they are 
less gentle than nudges and involve exerting significant decisional pressure. Thus, X 
'shoves' rather than 'nudges' Y in PRICE HIKE.
SHOPKEEPER
X (a shopkeeper) paternalistically nudges Y (a customer), by placing the more healthy 
food at the front of the shop where it is easiest to access, and the unhealthy food at the 
back of the shop where is it a little bit more difficult to access. 
34 ‘ To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not 
mandates. Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not”. Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008, p9)
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PRICE HIKE
Shopkeeper X 'shoves' customer Y, by significantly increasing the the price of unhealthy 
food, in a way that does not prevent or restrict Y from buying the unhealthy food, but does 
make buying unhealthy food significantly less appealing for X.
The problem, I submit, is that those minimalist accounts that make X's violating Y's liberty 
a necessary condition of paternalism, fail to reflect the existence of paternalist nudges and 
shoves. After all, nudges and shoves, by definition, do not violate Y's liberty. They do not 
coerce Y of even restrict Y's options. Coercion and liberty- violation completely takes away
Y's choice; nudges and shoves do not.
Once again, the point can be expressed in the form of a 'Challenge'. A Challenge that 
those minimalist accounts of paternalism that make X's violating Y's liberty a necessary 
condition of paternalism, fail to meet.
Challenge 7
Finally, also following on from Challenge 5, to reflect how X can interfere with Y's 
life/paternalise Y through merely 'nudging' or 'shoving' Y.
Conclusion
In this opening chapter, we have examined two distinct types of a more minimalist 
definition of paternalism. We have assessed whether these more minimalist definitions of 
paternalism can meet the seven Challenges an accurate definition of paternalism must 
meet, and suggested they do not.
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I want to place particular emphasis on three connected Challenges: Challenges 5, 6, and 
7. Taken together these Challenges reflect that paternalism necessarily involves some kind
of interference with Y's life (Challenge 5), and that this kind of interference comes in many 
forms e.g. through X violating Y's liberty, restricting Y's actions, deceiving Y, (Challenge 6), 
or simply through X nudging/shoving Y (Challenge 7). As will become clear, these three 
Challenges are perhaps the most difficult Challenges for an accurate definition of 
paternalism to meet. And will thus play a crucial role in the rest of this thesis.
Having suggested that the more minimalist, straightforward approaches to defining 
paternalism fail to meet the seven Challenges an accurate definition must meet, in Chapter
2 I turn to some of the more complicated, more precise, more finely tailored definitions of 
paternalism offered within the philosophical literature. In particular I look at three 
definitions; Dworkin (1983), Dworkin (2014), and Clark (2002). Each of three definitions 
conceptualise paternalist acts as interferences with Y's autonomous sphere, or some 
closely related concept. The question now is, can any of them meet the seven 'Challenges'
an accurate definition must meet?
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Chapter 2: defining paternalism as a benevolent interference with Y's autonomy
Introduction
In chapter 1 we looked at some of the more minimalist, straightforward ways of defining 
paternalism. Two kinds of more minimalist, straightforward definition of paternalism were 
identified; but ultimately it was suggested that neither is able to meet the seven 
'Challenges' than an accurate definition of paternalism must meet. 
Out of all the seven Challenges, we said that Challenges 5, 6, and 7 should be taken 
together, and may in the end be the most important (and difficult) Challenges to meet. 
Meeting these Challenges involves reflecting how paternalism necessarily involves some 
kind of interference with Y's life (Challenge 5), while also reflecting the various ways X can 
interfere with Y's life e.g. through X violating Y's liberty, restricting Y's actions, deceiving Y, 
(Challenge 6), or simply through X nudging/shoving Y (Challenge 7). Along these lines, it 
was disappointing to find that neither of the more minimalist ways of defining paternalism, 
was even able to meet these three Challenges.
In this second chapter, I want to look at a different, more nuanced approach to defining 
paternalism. In particular I want to look at three definitions of paternalism that 
conceptualise paternalist acts as benevolent interferences with Y's autonomy (or some 
closely related concept): Dworkin (1983), Dworkin (2014), and Clarke (2002). I then 
assess whether any of these definitions can meet the seven 'Challenges' identified in this 
thesis, or at least meet Challenges 5, 6, and 7.
Part 1: Dworkin (1983)
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No author looms quite as large over the philosophical debates about how to define 
paternalism, as Gerald Dworkin. His 1983 essay, 'Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts' is 
something of a landmark in the literature; a careful critique of several famous definitions of 
paternalism culminating in Dworkin presenting his own definition. According to the 
definition developed in this essay, paternalism should be characterised as a benevolently 
motivated interference with Y's 'autonomy'.35 But talk of 'autonomy' can be vague. What 
precisely does Dworkin mean when he refers to a violation of an agent's autonomy? 
According to Dworkin, X can interfere with Y's autonomy in two ways:
“either by preventing people [Y] from doing what they have decided or by interfering with 
the way they [Y] arrive at their decisions” 36
As I interpret Dworkin, the first kind of paternalist interference he identifies (where X 
interferes with Y by preventing Y from doing what Y has decided) corresponds to all types 
of paternalist interference other than cases of paternalist nudges/shoves, and so 
corresponds to Challenge 6. While the second kind of paternalist interference (where X 
interferes with Y by interfering with the way Y arrives at his decisions) corresponds to 
cases of paternalist nudges/shoves, and so corresponds to Challenge 7. 
Critique of Dworkin (1983)
I want to point to four problems with Dworkin's account.
35As Dworkin puts it, in order for someone's actions to count as paternalist, “there must be a violation of 
another person's autonomy (which I conceive as a distinct notion from that of liberty)” (1983, p107)
36Ibid
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i) decisions Y has actually made
Let's start by just focusing on the first kind of paternalist interference identified by Dworkin:
where X prevents Y from doing what he has decided. I suggested just above that for 
Dworkin, this corresponds to all types of paternalist interference, other than cases of 
paternalist nudges/shoves. But contra Dworkin, I submit that (leaving aside the issue of 
'nudges' and 'shoves') X can in fact paternalise Y without preventing Y from doing as he 
has decided. For X can paternalise Y by interfering with Y's life (say by violating Y's liberty, 
or coercing Y) in a way he believes Y would object to and would decide against if ever 
given the chance, although Y may never have actually made such a decision. Thus, 
consider the case of PAINT.
PAINT
X paints Y's house a light shade of blue while Y is out at work. X predicts that when Y gets
home, he will be angry. And that had X asked Y whether he wanted his house painted 
blue, Y would have said 'no', for X knows Y doesn't like the colour blue. However, at no 
point in Y's life has Y ever sat down and considered what colour he would want your 
house to be painted. Y has never 'decided' that he does not want a blue house. X has 
therefore not prevented Y from doing anything he ever decided to do.
Or recall SAVINGS ACCOUNT from Chapter 1.
SAVINGS ACCOUNT
Y has never considered the possibility of having a savings account and so has no relevant
wishes or desires on the matter. X, a friend of Y's, thinks that Y really should set up a 
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savings account, although X also believes that if confronted with the possibility of setting 
up a savings account, Y would unwisely decline. For this reason, X surreptitiously sets up 
a savings account in Y's name. 
In both cases X paternalises Y, even though X does not interfere with any decision Y has 
actually made. Rather, X interferes with Y's life in a significant way that he believes to be, 
though technically not contrary to any decision Y has made, contrary to what Y's wishes 
would be if Y was relevantly informed and knew about X's plans. Dworkin's definition of 
paternalism then, is revealed as being too narrow. 
Now a defender of Dworkin might try and respond to this objection in the following way. He
might concede that in PAINT and SAVINGS ACCOUNT X does not interfere with any 
decision Y has made. But claim that in these cases, to recall the other way X can 
paternalistically interfere with Y's life according to Dworkin's account, X interferes with the 
way Y arrives at a decision. After all, in both cases X forces a decision upon Y; in PAINT X 
forces Y to have a blue house, while in SAVINGS ACCOUNT X forces Y to have a savings 
account. And surely, so the argument goes, by forcing a decision upon Y in these ways, X 
thereby interferes with the way Y arrives at a decision.
However, this defence of Dworkin fails because it conflates a decision being forced upon Y,
with Y's making a decision. For in PAINT and SAVINGS ACCOUNT, Y does not arrive at 
any decision. It is not Y who decides to paint the house blue, it is X. It is not Y who sets up 
a savings account in his own name, it is X. Just because a decision is made in Y's name or
affects Y or is forced upon Y, does not mean it is Y who arrived at that decision. Otherwise 
in the case of an act of rape committed against Y, one would have to say that in some 
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sense Y arrived at the decision to engage in sex. Which of course is nonsense. 
ii) Challenges 5 and 6: what counts as something we can decide upon?
Still, I submit that even leaving aside this issue (that is, leaving aside cases like PAINT and
SAVINGS ACCOUNT where X has made no decision) there is another, more general 
problem with Dworkin's claim that benevolently motivated X paternalises Y when he 
prevents Y from doing what he (Y) has decided. Specifically, this part of Dworkin's account
is too ambiguous.
According to Challenge 6, an accurate definition of paternalism must reflect (leaving aside 
the issue of 'nudging' and 'shoving') all the ways in which X can interfere with Y's life such 
that his actions are potentially paternalist. The problem is, it is so deeply ambiguous what 
kinds of things Y can, and cannot decide to do, that it is virtually impossible to assess 
whether Dworkin's account meets Challenge 6.
For instance, it is obvious enough that X can paternalise Y by restricting Y's actions. The 
case of SUICIDE where benevolently motivated X paternalises Y, by refusing to let Y throw
herself on the train tracks demonstrates this point, as does a case like PILLS (a case of 
Dworkin's). And in Dworkin's defence, it is natural to think that X prevents Y from doing as 
he has decided, when he prevents Y from acting in a certain way.
PILLS
A husband (X), knowing his wife (Y) to be suicidal (let's say rationality suicidal so as to 
make it clear the husband's behaviour is hard paternalist, not soft), decides to hide his 
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sleeping pills in order to thwart his wife's attempts to kill herself.37
But what about a more subtle case of paternalism? What about a case where X does not 
interfere with how Y can act, but say interferes with what Y can know? Thus, consider 
DEATHBED:
DEATHBED
Y is on his deathbed. Y asks X how his family are. X lies to Y, telling Y that Y's family are 
all fine, even though the truth is that they were all just murdered. X lies so as to soothe Y 
in his dying moments, even though X knows Y wants to know the truth. 
Or what about a case where X doesn't interfere with how Y can act, but rather interferes 
with what Y can possess? 
FORCED KNIGHTHOOD
Y has been offered a knighthood by his country. X compels Y to accept the offer and so 
possess the title, even though X knows that Y wants to refuse the knighthood because he 
considers titles to be vain. X so acts because he thinks that there is much Y will gain from 
possessing a knighthood (e.g. a feeling of pride), and thinks Y will deeply regret refusing 
the knighthood in the future.
In both these cases X paternalises Y, and so Dworkin must show (assuming that X does 
not interfere with how Y arrives at a decision in these cases, which he clearly does not) 
that X prevents Y from doing as he has decided in these cases. Yet it is unclear whether 
forcing Y to possess something he does not want to possess, prevents Y from doing what 
37p106
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he has decided. Similarly, it is unclear whether deceiving Y prevents Y from doing what he 
has decided.
Similarly, recall our discussion of Challenge 5, and the cases of LAWYER and POSITIVE 
THOUGHTS. Meeting Challenge 5 involves reflecting how X does not paternalise Y in 
these cases because X does not interfere with Y's life. Can Dworkin's account reflect this? 
Or does X count as 'preventing Y from doing as he has decided' in a case like LAWYER 
where X decides not to go into law as her father desires. Again, matters are unclear.
The real problem is this: part of defining paternalism is clarifying the 'interference with Y's 
life' that paternalism involves (nudges and shoves aside). In order to do this, we need an 
account of what does and does not count as an interference with Y's life. Yet instead of 
giving us this and clarifying the concept of interference, Dworkin simply substitutes talk of 
'interference' for talk of the hardly more precise notion of 'X preventing Y from doing what 
he has decided'. At this point we might hope that Dworkin will clarify the concepts of 
'preventing' and 'doing'. But Dworkin never really does this either.
iii) autonomy and nudges
I now want to take a look at the second kind of paternalist interference Dworkin's 1983 
account identifies. That is, how Dworkin claims benevolently motivated X paternalises Y, 
when X interferes with the way Y arrives at his decisions. 
As noted above, this part of Dworkin's account is intended to explain how X can 
paternalise Y, even when the only way in which X interferes with Y's life is that X merely 
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'nudges'/'shoves' Y. But while reflecting how X can paternalise Y by merely 
nudging/shoving Y is important (see Challenge 7), it is difficult to square with one of 
Dworkin's more general claims: specifically, that all instances of paternalism involve X 
interfering with Y's autonomy. For Dworkin indicates that he construes the notion of 
autonomy in terms of the power of self-determination. Yet nudges and shoves, especially 
the former, do not obviously interfere with Y's autonomy qua self-determination. 
Recall for instance, the case of SHOPKEEPER in Chapter 1. In this case X 
paternalistically nudges Y by placing healthy food near the front of the shop; thereby 
making the healthy food more visible to Y, and thus encouraging Y to buy the healthy food 
and improve his diet. But it seems implausibly strong to suppose that X has therefore  
undermined Y's power of self-determination. Indeed, by definition nudges do not close Y's 
options, or force an option upon Y, or even exert significant decisional pressure on Y. As 
such, I submit that contra Dworkin, nudges do not so much interfere with Y's self-
determination. Rather they interfere with Y's ability to make decisions in a kind of 
decisional vacuum free of too much outside interference.
Now this might seem like a relatively minor point: that there is a discrepancy between 
Dworkin's definition of paternalism, and his more general claim that all cases of 
paternalism involve an interference with Y's autonomy qua self-determination. But one of 
the advantages of Dworkin's account was that it potentially furnished us with an 
explanation of what unites all the disparate kinds of interference with Y's life through which
X can paternalise Y. Now however, it seems as though this explanation ultimately falls 
apart under closer scrutiny.
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iv) Challenge 3 and rational persuasion
Fourth and finally, in the introduction to this thesis, we said that it was a widely accepted 
notion in the literature, that X does not paternalise Y when he merely engages Y in rational
persuasion.38 Indeed, we even said that Challenge 3 for an accurate definition of 
paternalism, was to reflect this idea. Yet, it is not so clear that Dworkin's account can meet 
this Challenge.
The problem is that, according to Dworkin, benevolently motivated X paternalises Y when 
he prevents Y from doing as he has decided. But benevolently motivated X can plausibly 
prevent Y from doing as he has decided, by merely engaging Y in rational persuasion. 
Consider for instance, a case where Y decides to eat a chocolate cake, but before Y is 
able to do so, is engaged in rational persuasion by his friend X. By informing Y of the 
various downsides to eating too much cake, X manages to persuade Y not to eat the cake.
In this case X has merely engaged Y in rational persuasion, and as such, should not count
as paternalising Y. Yet, X has prevented Y from doing as he has decided. Y decided to eat 
a chocolate cake, and was prevented from doing so. And as such will implausibly qualify 
as paternalising Y (providing X is also benevolently motivated) on Dworkin's account.
Now I take this to be a relatively minor problem. For Dworkin could respond to this problem
by simply adding an extra necessary condition in his account, that limits cases of 
paternalism to cases where X does not engage Y merely in rational persuasion. 
38I take it that Dworkin would agree that X cannot paternalise Y through mere rational persuasion, and that as
such we are dealing with an oversight in his account, rather than a deliberate divergence from the literature 
on Dworkin's part
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Alternatively he might claim that he is deploying the word 'prevented' in a special way, 
such that 'prevention' picks out forceful interferences with Y's decisions. Still, in it's current 
form Dworkin's account would seem to allow that X can paternalise Y through mere 
rational persuasion, and is all the weaker for it.
Part 2: Dworkin (2014)
Now more recently Dworkin has offered a modified version of his 1983 account. Does this 
version succeed where the other one fails? According to Dworkin's updated 2014 definition
of paternalism:
“X acts paternalistically towards Y by doing (omitting) Z:
1.  Z (or its omission) interferes with the liberty or autonomy of Y.
2.  X does so without the consent of Y.
3.  X does so only because X believes Z will improve the welfare of Y (where 
this includes preventing his welfare from diminishing), or in some way promote the 
interests, values, or good of Y.”'39
Critique of Dworkin (2014)
I want to suggest that despite the modifications to his original account, Dworkin's more 
recent definition not only solves none of the problems associated with his original account; 
it even suffers from an important additional problem.
i) Dworkin (2014) addresses none of the problems associated with Dworkin (1983)
39Dworkin (2014)
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Each of the four problems with Dworkin's 1983 account, relate to the idea that 
benevolently motivated X paternalises Y when he interferes with Y's autonomy qua X 
either preventing Y from doing what Y has decided or interfering with the way Y arrives at 
his decisions. But in Dworkin's 2014 definition, X still paternalises Y when he interferes 
with Y's autonomy in this way, just so long as X also acts without Y's consent. 
As Y has not consented to X's actions in any of the counter-examples we evoked in our 
critique of Dworkin (1983) anyway, I thus suggest that Dworkin's updated 2014 account 
cannot respond to any of the four objections levelled against his 1983 account.
ii) benevolent motive
Second, in his 1983 account, Dworkin referred rather generally to the idea that paternalism
necessarily involves a benevolent motive on X's part regarding Y. And indeed, this is surely
right. But what we didn't get in the 1983 account, was a precise description of what it 
means for X to hold a benevolent motive with regards to Y. In his 2014 account, Dworkin 
corrects this oversight. In his updated account, he argues that in order to paternalise Y, X 
must act:
“only because X believes Z [his actions] will improve the welfare of Y (where this includes 
preventing his welfare from diminishing), or in some way promote the interests, values, or 
good of Y”
But I submit that this description of what it means to hold a benevolent motive with regards
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to Y, is too narrow. The problem lies in Dworkin's assumption that in order for X to hold a 
benevolent motive with regards to Y, the only reason for X's actions must be that X 
believes his actions will benefit Y. Yet consider a case I will call ALCOHOL PROBLEM.
ALCOHOL PROBLEM
Y has a serious alcohol problem. X has a genuine concern for Y and wants X to stop 
drinking before he hurts himself one day. He also, additionally, is concerned for Y's 
partner, Z, whom he knows suffers when Y drinks. So motivated, X breaks into Y's house 
and throws away all the alcohol he can find.
In this case, I take it that X has a benevolent motive with regards to Y. This seems to be 
established by how X genuinely wishes to promote Y's good, and how this seems to give 
him sufficient reason to act. But this does not entail that benefiting Y is actually the only 
reason that X acts. For X is also additionally motivated by the prospect of promoting Z's 
good. On Dworkin's account, this additional motivating factor discounts X from counting as
benevolently motivated. But this is implausible.
Ultimately then, I suggest that not only does Dworkin's updated 2014 account fail to 
address the problems with his original 1983 account; in the end it may suffer from an 
additional problem that the original did not.
Part 3: Clarke
Still, I want to look at one more definition of paternalism that characterises paternalism 
along similar lines as Dworkin; that is, as a benevolent act by X that undermines Y's self-
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determination, or autonomy, or ability to act as he wishes, or some related notion. Thus, let
us take a look at the definition of paternalism offered by Simon Clarke (2002). 
Clarke's definition is the result of a careful examination of both a wide range of cases, and 
a wide range of different accounts of paternalism, including Gerald Dworkin's 1983 
definition. According to Clarke, X paternalises Y IFF X:
“1) aims to close an option that would otherwise be open to Y, or X chooses for Y in the 
event that Y is unable to choose for himself; and 2) to the extent that X does so in order to 
promote Y's good” 40
Clarke's account then, distinguishes two ways in which X can interfere with Y's life such 
that his actions are potentially paternalist. X can aim to close an option that would 
otherwise be open to Y. Or X can choose for Y in the event that Y is unable to choose for 
himself. The latter refers to a relatively small class of paternalism cases where Y is in 
some way incapacitated and so unable to make a choice. Indeed, Clarke claims that this 
part of his account is motivated by the existence of paternalism cases like BLOOD 
TRANSFUSION41; a case we saw in the introduction to this thesis where Y is unconscious.
The former therefore, refers to all other cases of paternalism. That is, cases of paternalism
where X is not incapacitated.
Unlike Dworkin, Clarke does not explicitly conceptualise paternalist interferences as 
benevolent interferences with Y's autonomy. But by conceptualising paternalist 
interferences as benevolent behaviour that limits what options are available for Y to 
choose (either by closing those options or choosing on Y's behalf), Clarke's account 
40Clarke (2002, p89). I have also capitalised the subjects (X and Y) in Clarke's definition
41Clarke (2002, p84)
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nonetheless evokes the idea of a paternalist act as a benevolent interference with Y's self-
determination.
What's more, as Clarke's account does not conceptualise paternalist acts as interferences 
with Y's decisions/decision-making, instead introducing the idea of a paternalist act as an 
interference with Y's options/choosing, Clarke's account makes an interesting contrast with
Dworkin's two accounts of paternalism.
Critique of Clarke
Still, I want to take a closer, more critical look at Clarke's account. In total I highlight four 
issues with Clarke's account. 
i) Challenges 5 and 6: ambiguity in Clarke's account
I want to start by examining how Clarke's account deals with Challenges 5 and 6; but 
leaving the issue of 'nudges' and 'shoves' (Challenge 7) to one side. With this in mind, 
meeting Challenge 5 involves reflecting how paternalism requires that X aims to interfere 
with Y's life in some significant way. While meeting Challenge 6 involves reflecting, nudges
and shoves aside, the variety of ways through which X can interfere with Y's life in some 
significant way. 
Now in order to assess whether Clarke's account can meet these two Challenges, it is 
important to get a handle on what precisely Clarke means when he talks about 'options', 
and how X can count as closing Y's options.
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One point that Clarke makes clear enough, is that whatever counts as an option of Y's on 
his account, is closely related to what choices Y has. Consider, for instance, Clarke's 
remarks on cases where Y has no options. Clarke claims that in BLOOD TRANSFUSION, 
Y's having no options is explained by Y's being unconscious and hence having no ability to
choose because: 
“The options of the patient are already closed in virtue of the fact that [Y] is unconscious. 
Y's unconsciousness prevents her from having the options to choose” 42 
Furthermore, the idea that to have an option is to be able to choose, mirrors the emphasis 
on choice Clarke places on the latter kind of paternalist act; that is, in Clarke's claim that 
benevolently motivated X paternalises Y by choosing for Y in the event Y is unable to 
choose for himself. Finally, consider Clarke's comments on David Archard's 1990 definition
of paternalism. Clarke says that the definition he offers is virtually identical to the first two 
conditions (there are three in total) of Archard's definition of paternalism. These two 
conditions are:
“(1) X aims to bring it about that with respect to some state(s) of affairs which concerns Y's
good Y's choice or opportunity to choose is denied or diminished;
(2) X's belief that this behaviour promotes Y's good is the main reason for Y's behaviour” 43
Archard's second condition is standard enough and not the issue here. His first condition, 
however, is more interesting. It characterises paternalist acts as interferences with Y's 
42Clarke (2002, p84). Changed 'her' to 'Y'
43Archard (1990), my emphasis, changed subjects
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choices, and taking at face value Clarke's comments about the similarity between his own 
account and Archard's, lends further support to the idea that to have an option closed is to 
have one's choice diminished in some way.
Yet, beyond this idea that to close an option of Y's is to interfere with what choices Y has 
available, matters are left frustratingly ambiguous. What kinds of things can Y make a 
choice regarding? What kinds of things do, and do not number among Y's options? In 
particular, the ambiguity in this part of Clarke's account makes assessing whether the 
account meets Challenge 6 difficult.
For instance, we have seen that, as in a case like CAKE, X can paternalise Y through 
violating Y's liberty. Similarly, we have seen that as in a case like PROFESSOR, X can 
paternalise Y through restricting how Y can act. And to Clarke's credit, it seems reasonable
enough to assume that X closes an option of Y's when X violates Y's liberty or restricts 
how Y can act. After all, such interferences seem to interfere with Y's choice to act a 
certain way. But to mirror a point made earlier when discussing Dworkin (1983), what 
about cases like DEATHBED and FORCED KNIGHTHOOD? Does preventing Y from 
knowing the truth or forcing Y to possess a title he does not like, thereby 'close an option 
of Y's'? 
This problem also muddies the waters concerning Challenge 5 (reflecting how X does not 
paternalise Y in cases like LAWYER, ROSES, and POSITIVE THOUGHTS where X does 
not interfere with Y's life in any significant way). For instance, Clarke discusses the case of
LAWYER in some detail, and claims that X does not aim to close an option of Y's in this 
case. But doesn't Y (the father) make a certain choice in LAWYER? Specifically that X (his 
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daughter) should go into law. Doesn't it follow then, that X interferes with Y's choices by 
deciding not to go into law? Shouldn't X then, count as aiming to close an option in 
LAWYER, and therefore as paternalising Y on Clarke's account?
Overall then, the problem with this part of Clarke's account is that it is too ambiguous. One
of the things that we want an accurate definition of paternalism to do, is shed some light on
through what kind of interference with Y's life, X can and cannot paternalise Y (see 
Challenges 5, 6, and 7). However as we have seen, (leaving aside the issue of Challenge 
7 and paternalist nudges/shoves) Clarke's account doesn't really do this. Admittedly Clarke
moves past obscurely talking about paternalist acts as involving interferences with Y's life. 
But only to introduce the marginally less obscure notion of paternalist acts involving 
closures of Y's options/choices. 
ii) Nudges and Challenge 7
The second issue I want to raise with Clarke's account concerns paternalist nudges. As we
have seen throughout this thesis, X can paternalise Y even when the only way in which he 
interferes with Y's life, is by nudging Y. Indeed, we even dedicated Challenge 7 to 
reflecting the existence of such paternalist nudges, along with the existence of paternalist 
shoves. Yet, it is unclear whether Clarke's account, and his conceptualisation of paternalist
acts as benevolent acts by X either aimed at closing an option that would otherwise be 
open to Y, or choosing for Y in the event that Y is unable to choose for himself, can 
actually reflect the existence of such paternalist nudges and meet Challenge 7.
Recall, for instance, the case of SHOPKEEPER.
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SHOPKEEPER
X (a shopkeeper) paternalistically nudges Y (a customer), by placing the more healthy 
food at the front of the shop where it is easiest to access, and the unhealthy food at the 
back of the shop where is it a little bit more difficult to access. 
In this case X paternalistically nudges Y. But X does not 'choose for Y in the event that Y is
unable to choose for himself'. Y is not incapacitated or unable to decide for himself; and 
besides, Y is still able to make a choice himself.
Nor does X 'aim to close an option that would otherwise be open to Y'. As was suggested 
in chapter 1, by definition nudges do not forbid or close any of Y's options. Rather, nudges 
merely constitute an attempt to (gently) influence Y so as to make his choosing a certain 
option, more likely.  As such, Clarke's account would seem to licence the implausible 
conclusion that X does not paternalise Y in a case like SHOPKEEPER, nor any other case 
where the only way in which X interferes with Y's life is by X merely nudging Y.
iii) rational persuasion and Challenge 3
The third worry I have with Clarke's account concerns the issue of rational persuasion. As 
we have seen throughout this thesis, an accurate definition of paternalism must reflect how
X does not paternalise Y when he merely engages Y in rational persuasion (Challenge 3). 
However, like Dworkin's accounts, it is unclear whether Clarke can actually meet 
Challenge 3.
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According to Clarke, benevolently motivated X paternalises Y whenever he 'closes an 
option that would otherwise be open to Y'. But consider again what kinds of things number 
among Y's 'options'. We said earlier that this issue is somewhat ambiguous and unclear. 
Yet it seems plausible to suppose that among Y's options, is whether Y is subject to 
rational persuasion or not. It follows then, that when X engages Y in rational persuasion, 
he thereby closes one of Y's options: the option of not being subject to rational persuasion.
As such, Clarke's account will implausibly label X's actions as paternalist, even in those 
cases where benevolently motivated X merely engages Y in rational persuasion.
iv) Challenge 4
Fourth and finally, in Chapter 1 we suggested that Challenge 4 for an accurate definition of
paternalism, is as follows: to reflect that X does not paternalise Y in cases like BEE and 
CIGARETTES, where X has thought about what Y's relevantly informed wishes are/would 
be if Y was relevantly informed, and believes his actions to be in line with said relevantly 
informed wishes.
BEE
X and Y are in the park. A bee flies on Y's back with the seeming intent to sting Y. Y does 
not seem to notice the bee, but X does. Assuming that Y would not want to be stung if he 
knew there was a bee around, X decides to push Y to one side and swat away the bee. X 
acts without Y's consent for he believes there is no time to waste.
CIGARETTES
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Y wants to finally quit smoking. To this end, Y asks his friend X to come to his house, and 
throw away all his cigarettes. X is happy to oblige as he thinks quitting smoking will do Y 
the world of good.
We will come to the issue of precisely why X's actions seem to be discounted from being 
paternalist in these cases, later in this thesis. But in a rough and ready way, the essence 
lies in how paternalism necessarily involves X disregarding Y's judgement/wishes 
regarding what is in Y best interests. And how when X has properly considered what Y's 
relevantly informed wishes are/would be, and takes himself to be acting in line with these 
relevantly informed wishes, X shows no such disregard.
However, Clarke's account fails to reflect this idea (and hence fails to meet Challenge 4). 
As we have seen, according to Clarke, it is sufficient for X's paternalising Y, that X is 
benevolently motivated and aims to close an option that would otherwise be open to Y. It 
follows that the matter of whether X has carefully considered what Y's relevantly informed 
wishes are and believes himself to be acting in line with Y's relevantly informed wishes, is 
rendered irrelevant on Clarke's account. As such, Clarke's account misdiagnoses X's 
actions in cases like BEE and CIGARETTES as paternalist.
Conclusion
Overall then, we have seen that it is problematic to define paternalism as a benevolent 
interference with Y's autonomous sphere (or some closely related concept). Indeed, this 
way of defining paternalism does not even appear to offer a satisfactory answer to the 
narrower question of what kind of interference with Y's life paternalist acts involve (see 
Challenges 5, 6, and 7). 
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I submit then, that having looked in Chapters 1 and 2 at some of the more conventional 
ways of defining paternalism and of explaining what kind of interference with Y's life 
paternalism involves, and having found these more conventional definitions to be 
inadequate, that in the next chapter we should look at a couple less conventional ways of 
defining paternalism. To this end, in Chapter 3 we turn our attention to those definitions of 
paternalism offered by Bernard Gert and Charles Culver (1976), and Jonathan Quong 
(2011).
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      Chapter 3:  some less conventional definitions of paternalism
Introduction
Throughout this thesis we have identified seven Challenges an accurate definition of 
paternalism must meet. Special emphasis has been placed on Challenges 5, 6, 7, which 
should be taken together, and may in the end be the most important and most difficult of 
the Challenges to meet. 
Meeting these three Challenges involves reflecting how paternalism necessarily involves, 
in a rough and ready way in need of cashing-out, some kind of 'interference with Y's life' 
(Challenge 5); but that there are a wide variety of ways in which X can 'interfere with Y's 
life' such that his actions are potentially paternalist e.g. violating Y's liberty, restricting Y's 
actions, deceiving Y, controlling what Y possesses (see Challenge 6), or simply through 
'nudging'/'shoving' Y (see Challenge 7).
Challenge 5
Following on from Challenge 5, to reflect the wide variety of interferences with Y's 
life ('nudges' and 'shoves' aside) through which X can paternalise Y. e.g. through 
violating Y's liberty, through controlling what actions Y can do, through deception, 
etc.
Challenge 7
Finally, also following on from Challenge 5, to reflect how X can interfere with Y's 
life/paternalise Y through merely 'nudging' or 'shoving' Y.
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However, despite having spent Chapters 1 and 2 looking at some of the most popular and 
well regarded definitions of paternalism offered within the philosophical literature, we have 
neither found a definition of paternalism that can meet these seven Challenges, or even a 
definition that can meet Challenges 5, 6, and 7. 
Along these lines, in this third chapter I examine a couple less conventional definitions of 
paternalism; the 1976 definition offered by Bernard Gert and Charles Culver, and the 2011 
definition offered by Jonathan Quong. By taking a less conventional approach to defining 
paternalism, these definitions may just be able to provide us with a new way of meeting 
the seven Challenges an accurate definition of paternalism must meet; or at least 
Challenges 5, 6, and 7. 
Part 1: Gert and Culver
According to Bernard Gert and Charles Culver, X paternalises Y IFF:
“X believes that: 
1. his action is for Y's good
2. he is qualified to act on Y's behalf
3. his action involves violating a moral rule (or doing that which will require him to 
do so) with regard to Y
4. he is justified in acting on Y's behalf independently of Y's past, present or 
immediately forthcoming (free, informed) consent
5. Y believes (perhaps falsely) that he (Y) generally knows what is for his own 
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good.” 44
It is Gert and Culver's third condition that sets their account apart from others within the 
literature. It reflects their attempt to meet what I have termed Challenges 5, 6, and 7. But 
instead of ruling, as other philosophers have, that paternalism necessarily involves X 
interfering with Y's life qua violating Y's liberty, or qua undermining Y's autonomy, or qua 
closing Y's options, Gert and Culver's third condition instead rules that paternalism 
necessarily involves X interfering with Y's life is qua X violating a 'moral rule' with regard to
Y.
Yet Gert and Culver's account, and in particular their third condition, has received a lot of 
negative critical attention. Perhaps somewhat unfairly. Along these lines, I want to take a 
look at three objections that have been levelled against Gert and Culver's account in the 
philosophical literature, before explaining how I think Gert and Culver can respond to each 
one. 
Let's start with an objection put forward by Gerald Dworkin. According to Dworkin, the 
problem with assuming that cases of paternalism necessarily involve X interfering with Y's 
life qua violating a moral rule with regard to Y, is that such an assumption is unable to 
reflect how X paternalises Y in a case like PILLS. 
PILLS
“A husband [X] who knows his wife [Y] is [rationally] suicidal hides his sleeping pills” 45
Dworkin argues that although X clearly paternalises Y in PILLS, X does not violate a moral 
44Gert and Culver (1976, p49-50), changed subjects
45Dworkin (1983, p106)
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rule with regard to Y. 
“He [the husband, X] violates no moral rule. They are his pills and he can put them 
wherever he wishes” 46
The last sentence is key. Dworkin seems to read the concept of a 'moral rule violation' as 
equivalent to a rights violation. Hence, Dworkin assumes that X does not violate a moral 
rule with regard to Y in a case like PILLS because X does not interfere with Y's rights. 
(“they are his pills”). From this Dworkin concludes that Gert and Culver's account 
implausibly discounts X's actions from being paternalist in PILLS, and any other case 
where X does not violate Y's rights.
But Dworkin's objection fails because its premises are false. 'Moral rule violations' are not 
equivalent to rights violations. Rather, Gert and Culver make it clear that X violates a moral
rule with regard to Y any time X acts in a way that requires some kind of (moral) 
justification. Or, to put it another way, X violates a moral rule when he acts in a prima facie 
morally problematic way.
“In our opinion, violating a moral rule involves doing something that would be 
morally wrong unless one has an adequate justification for doing it” 47
Adding that:
“thus, killing, causing pain (mental or physical), disabling, and depriving of freedom,
opportunity, or pleasure are all violations of moral rules. The same is true of 
46Ibid
47Gert and Culver (1976, p51-52)
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deceiving, breaking a promise, and cheating” 48
Gert and Culver then, can in fact explain why X violates a moral rule with regard to Y in 
PILLS. For although X acts 'rightfully' (does not violate any of Y's rights) in PILLS, he 
nonetheless acts in a way that is in need of some kind of moral justification (a prima facie 
morally problematic way). After all, X acts in a way he knows will thwart Y's ends and quite 
possibly cause Y some degree of mental pain.
With this in mind we can now respond to a second objection levelled against Gert and 
Culver's account, put forward by Jonathan Quong. Unlike Dworkin, Quong seems open to 
the idea that X can violate a moral rule with regard to Y without violating Y's rights. In fact, 
Quong seems to equate moral rule violations with acts that are all things considered 
wrong. Along these lines Quong rejects Gert and Culver's account because it cannot 
explain how X can paternalise Y by acting in a “morally admirable fashion”, or otherwise 
acting in a way that is not all things considered wrong, as when X refuses to cooperate 
with Y or help Y out.
“The moralized definition [Quong's term for Gert and Culver's definition] is also 
unable to explain cases [of paternalism] where one party refuses to assist another 
person, or refuses to cooperate with that person for paternalistic reasons. If I 
refuse to loan you £50 because I think you are going to spend it on heroin, I 
violate no moral rule, yet my refusal may nevertheless be paternalistic” 49
But again the problem with this criticism of Gert and Culver, is that it misconstrues the 
concept of a moral rule violation. X need not all things considered morally wrong Y, in order
48Ibid
49Quong (2011, p79)
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to violate a moral rule with regard to Y. Rather, X simply needs to interact with Y in a way 
that stands in need of moral justification (in a way that involves a prima facie moral bad). 
This explains why, contra Quong, X may in fact violate a moral rule with regard to Y simply 
by refusing to cooperate with Y, as refusing to cooperate with somebody who wants your 
cooperation is plausibly at least prima facie morally wrong. Similarly, one can act in an all 
things considered morally admirable fashion, while still acting in a prima facie bad way, as 
when one steals a loaf of bread (a prima facie moral bad) in order to save ten dying 
children. 
Finally, I think we can now respond to a third, more practical objection levelled against 
Gert and Culver's account. Given that Gert and Culver claim all cases of paternalism 
involve X violating a moral rule with regards to Y, it might seem as though their account of 
paternalism is problematic, because it begs the moral question in favour of the anti-
paternalist. 
What precisely is the objection here? I think there are two main reasons Gert and Culver 
might be accused of begging the moral question in favour of the anti-paternalist. First, 
some philosophers have claimed that assuming that paternalism necessarily involves 
some morally problematic feature (i.e. a moral rule violation), entails that it is “conceptually
incoherent to think that paternalism is morally permissible”.50 And that it is in this sense 
that Gert and Culver's account begs the moral question. 
Yet as we have seen, to assume that paternalism involves violating a moral rule, does not 
entail that paternalism is necessarily all things considered wrong. Rather, it is to make the 
50Coons and Weber (2013)
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importantly weaker claim that paternalist acts always stand in need of moral justification 
because they are prima facie morally wrong.
Still, there is a related, more subtle objection. For perhaps the problem is that even if 
assuming that paternalism involves some prima facie morally wrong features does not 
assume that paternalism is all things considered wrong, it nonetheless concedes too much
to the anti-paternalist. It is, so to speak, to stack the argument against those that think 
paternalism can be justified (presumably virtually all people), and stack the argument in 
favour of those that think paternalism can never be justified or only justified on rare 
occasions.51
Still, I think this objection to Gert and Culver's account is somewhat exaggerated. For I 
submit that for two reasons, there is no need to think that assuming paternalism to be 
prima facie morally wrong entails that paternalism is hard to justify.
First, as we have seen, some of the actions that qualify as 'moral rule violations' (as prima 
facie moral wrongs), are fairly benign and relatively easy to all things considered morally 
justify. As such, assuming that paternalism involves 'moral rule violations' (prima facie 
wrongs), should not imply that paternalism is necessarily difficult to morally justify.
Second, not only may there be lots of cases of paternalism where the relevant moral rule 
violation involved with paternalism may be easy to justify, paternalism qua paternalism 
may also furnish us with a ready-made prima facie moral justification. 
After all, as we have seen throughout this thesis, paternalism necessarily involves a 
51See Bullock (2015)
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benevolent motive on X's part (see Challenge 1). And X's aiming to provide some benefit 
for Y, or protect Y from some harm, or otherwise promote Y's good, plausibly provides an 
at least prima facie moral justification for X's actions. 
Of course, there is a debate to be had about how powerful the prima facie justification is 
that a benevolent motive provides. And how prima facie morally bad the aspects involved 
in paternalism are. And whether it is appropriate to think the prima facie bad(s) involved in 
paternalism can be outweighed by the prima facie good(s), or whether such a balancing 
act is invalid.52 But such issues take us beyond the limits of this thesis.
Critique of Gert and Culver
However, despite having taken some time to defend Gert and Culver's account from some 
of the objections in the literature that have been levelled against it, I now want to offer 
three of my own objections that I think are more telling.
i) Challenge 5 and 'moral rule violation'
First, as we have just seen, the concept of a 'moral rule violation', as deployed by Gert and
Culver, may be broader than philosophers have generally appreciated.53 Now, however, I 
want to suggest that it may in fact be too broad. More precisely, I submit that Gert and 
Culver's claim that paternalism involves X interfering with Y's life qua X violating a moral 
rule with regards to Y, leaves their account unable to meet Challenge 5.
Meeting Challenge 5 involves reflecting how X does not paternalise Y in cases like 
52See Grill (2015)
53See the first two criticisms canvassed above
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LAWYER and POSITIVE THOUGHTS and ROSES, because in these cases X does not 
aim to interfere with Y's life in any significant way. In these cases however, X may well 
count as violating a moral rule with regard to Y, even if he does not aim to interfere with Y's
life in any significant way. Recall for instance, the case of LAWYER.
“a father (a lawyer) who wants his daughter to become a lawyer. The daughter 
believes that she would make a very good lawyer. Indeed, she believes it likely that 
she would be more successful professionally than her father, who has managed to 
survive only on a marginal basis. Because she believes that such success would 
make her father very unhappy, the daughter decides to become a doctor instead” 54
We said earlier that, according to Gert and Culver, X violates a moral rule with regard to Y 
anytime X's actions impact on Y's life in such a way as requires moral justification. Thus, X
can violate a moral rule with regard to Y by violating Y's rights, or by restricting how Y can 
act, or by deceiving Y. But less dramatically, it would seem to follow that X also violates a 
moral rule with regard to Y when X merely causes Y emotional pain, or when X thwarts Y's
ends. The problem with this, is that X therefore plausibly counts as 'violating a moral rule' 
with regards to Y in LAWYER. After all, X seems to thwart Y's ends and may well cause Y 
emotional pain in LAWYER.
Overall then, Gert and Culver's definition of paternalism, and in particular their 
conceptualising paternalism as involving X interfering with Y's life qua X violating a moral 
rule regarding Y, would seem to render their account too broad. More precisely, it leaves 
their account unable to discount X's actions as paternalist in cases like LAWYER, where X 
does not appear to interfere with Y's life in any significant way, but does violate a moral 
54Dworkin (1983, p106)
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rule with regards to Y.
ii) Challenge 7: moral rule violations and nudges
Second, I submit that Gert and Culver's contention that paternalist acts necessarily involve
X interfering with Y's life qua violating a moral rule with regards to Y, also renders their 
account too narrow. 
Recall that Challenge 7 for an accurate definition of paternalism, is to reflect how one of 
the ways X can interfere with Y's life such that his actions are potentially paternalist, is by 
simply 'nudging' Y. But 'nudges' do not obviously violate a moral rule with regards to Y.
After all, nudges neither restrict nor compel how Y can act. They do not involve violating 
Y's liberty, and need not involve causing Y pain or distress. They do not even exert 
significant decisional pressure on Y; for by definition, the decisional influence a nudge 
exerts must be potentially easily outweighed/neutralised by other factors (e.g. conflicting 
desires). As such, it would seem doubtful, contra Gert and Culver, that X necessarily 
violates a moral rule with regards to Y when he merely nudges Y. 
iii) Challenge 4: past, present, and immediately forthcoming consent
My third and final worry concerns Challenge 4. Meeting Challenge 4 involves reflecting 
how X does not paternalise Y in cases like CIGARETTES and BEE, where X has thought 
about what Y's relevantly informed wishes are/would be if Y was relevantly informed, and 
X believes his actions to be in line with Y's relevantly informed wishes. 
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CIGARETTES
Y wants to finally quit smoking. To this end Y asks his friend X to come to his house, and 
throw away all his cigarettes. X is happy to oblige as he thinks quitting smoking will do Y 
the world of good.
BEE
X and Y are in the park. A bee flies on Y's back with the seeming intent to sting Y. Y does 
not seem to notice the bee, but X does. Assuming that Y would not want to be stung if he 
knew there was a bee around, X decides to push Y to one side and swat away the bee. X 
acts without Y's consent for he believes there is no time to waste.
Why should we think X's actions are discounted from being paternalist in these cases? I 
have suggested, in a rough and ready way still in need of clarification, that the answer is 
connected to the issue of disregard. Paternalism, so the argument goes, necessarily 
involves a special kind of disregard on X's part, for Y's relevantly informed 
judgement/wishes regarding what is in Y's best interests. But in cases like CIGARETTES 
and BEE, where X has considered what Y's relevantly informed wishes are/would be, and 
believes himself to be acting in line with these relevantly informed wishes, X does not 
demonstrate this disregard. On the contrary, X shows respect for Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes. As such, X's actions should be discounted from counting as 
paternalist in these cases.
Now there are a number of ways one might reflect this point in one's definition of 
paternalism. Gert and Culver try to reflect the point (and so meet Challenge 4) through 
their fourth (necessary) condition of paternalism:
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“4. [X believes] he is justified in acting on Y's behalf independently of Y's past, 
present or immediately forthcoming (free, informed) consent” 55
Gert and Culver's fourth condition limits cases of paternalism to cases where X believes: Y
has not consented to his actions already, not will Y consent in the immediately forthcoming
future. A corollary of this condition, is that X does not paternalise Y when X believes he is 
acting with Y's consent, or in a way Y will consent to in the immediately forthcoming future.
It follows from this, that X does not paternalise Y in CIGARETTES and BEE. After all, Y 
has consented to X's throwing away his cigarettes in CIGARETTES; while in BEE X seems
to believe that Y will consent to his pushing Y aside in the immediately forthcoming future, 
once Y realises that X was only pushing him aside so as to protect Y from a bee sting.
In light of this, it might be tempting to conclude that Gert and Culver's account meets 
Challenge 4. Actually I think that, for two reasons, we should resist this conclusion. First, it 
seems suspect to suppose that an agent (Y) can retrospectively give his consent (to X's 
actions). Y might be able to retrospectively approve of X's actions, or forgive X. But it is 
unclear if these attitudes amount to consent. Thus, we have reason to be suspicious of 
Gert and Culver's evocation of 'immediately forthcoming consent'. 
Second, I submit that this condition does not in fact meet Challenge 4 after all. Consider a 
case I will call COMA. 
COMA
Y has fallen into a sudden and permanent coma. X, a close friend of Y's, has thought long 
and hard about the issue, and wholeheartedly believes that Y would, if he could somehow 
55Gert and Culver (1976, p49-50), changed subjects
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communicate with X, tell him to pull the plug. Because of this, X pulls the plug. X knows 
that Y has never actually given his consent; and because his actions will end Y's life, 
knows Y will never get the chance to actually give his consent in the future.
X's actions in COMA are relevantly similar to X's actions in CIGARETTES and BEE, and 
should be discounted from counting as paternalist for the same reason. X has considered 
what Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes are concerning his own good, or at least 
what they would be if Y was relatively informed and in a position to form 
judgements/wishes, and believes his actions to be in line with these relevantly informed 
wishes. Thus, an accurate definition of paternalism must reflect how X does not 
paternalise Y in cases like CIGARETTES, BEE and COMA (Challenge 4).
Yet, Gert and Culver's fourth condition fails to discount X's actions from being paternalist in
COMA. After all, Y has not consented to X's actions. Nor ever will he. As such, in COMA X 
must be acting in a way he believes is justifiable independent of Y's 
past/present/immediately forthcoming consent. And thus X must (implausibly) count as 
potentially paternalist according to Gert and Culver's account. Gert and Culver's account is
too narrow to meet Challenge 4.
Overall then, despite its originality, and despite being more plausible than critics have 
generally given it credit for, Gert and Culver's account is revealed as being deeply 
problematic. In particular, three problems have been identified. First, Gert and Culver's 
conceptualisation of paternalist interferences as moral rule violations is unable to meet 
Challenge 5. Second, the same part of their account also renders the definition unable to 
meet Challenge 7. Third, Gert and Culver's account and their conceptualising paternalist 
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interferences as acts that X believes Y has not consented to nor will consent to in the 
immediately forthcoming future, is unable to meet Challenge 4.
Part 2: Jonathan Quong
I turn now to examining the 2011 account of paternalism offered by Jonathan Quong. Like 
Gert and Culver, Quong defines paternalism in a somewhat unconventional way. 
According to Quong's so called 'judgemental definition', X paternalises Y IFF:
“1. Agent X attempts to improve the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values 
of agent Y with regard to a particular decision or situation that Y faces.
2. X's act is motivated by a negative judgement about Y's ability (assuming Y has the 
relevant information) to make the right decision or manage the particular situation in a way
that will effectively advance Y's welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values.” 56
What really makes Quong's account stand out is his second condition. Taken along with 
condition 1, the only limit it imposes on X's benevolently motivated actions counting as 
paternalistic, is that X is motivated by a certain negative judgement regarding Y. 
Specifically, X must be motivated by the somewhat supercilious, negative judgement that: 
without his intervention Y will fail to make the right decision/manage his particular situation
in a way that will advance his own ends.
Critique of Quong
56Quong (2011, p80), changed subjects to X and Y
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I want to highlight three problems with Quong's judgemental definition.
i) Challenge 5
First, I have argued that one of the most important Challenges for a definition to meet, is 
Challenge 5. Meeting Challenge 5 involves reflecting how X does not paternalise Y in 
cases like LAWYER, POSITIVE THOUGHTS and ROSES, where in some rough and 
ready sense in need of clarification, X does not aim to interfere with Y's life in any 
significant way.
With this Challenge in mind, some philosophers have argued that paternalism necessarily 
involves X interfering with Y's life qua violating Y's liberty. Others have emphasised the 
notion of paternalism involving an interference with Y's autonomy. While some have 
argued that paternalism involves a restriction of Y's options. And as we saw earlier in this 
chapter, Gert and Culver argue that paternalism involves X interfering with Y's life qua X 
violating a moral rule with regard to Y. 
Yet, Quong's account places no such restriction on what can count as an act of 
paternalism. He claims that in order to paternalise Y, benevolently motivated X must 
merely hold a certain negative judgement regarding Y. As a result, Quong's account is 
unable to explain why X does not paternalise Y in cases like LAWYER, POSITIVE 
THOUGHTS and ROSES. After all, in each of these cases X thinks that Y could do with his
help. X thus holds a 'negative judgement' regarding Y and a benevolent motive. And thus X
(implausibly) counts as paternalising Y on Quong's account.
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ii) Challenge 1: a benevolent motive regarding Y
My second objection revolves around Challenge 1. In many ways, Challenge 1 is the most 
basic of all the seven Challenges. It requires that an accurate definition of paternalism 
reflects how in order to paternalise Y, X must act because he holds a genuinely benevolent
motive with regards to Y. 
Quong attempts to meet Challenge 1 through his first (necessary) condition. According to 
this condition, paternalism requires that:
“Agent X attempts to improve the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or 
values of agent Y with regard to a particular decision or situation that Y faces” 57
In other words then, on Quong's account, a benevolent motive regarding Y, consists in X 
aiming to promote Y's good. Yet I think this is an implausibly broad description of a 
benevolent motive. Consider for instance, the following case:
BET
X has placed a bet with Z, regarding Y's blood pressure. X has wagered that when the 
doctor records Y's blood pressure next week, Y will have low blood pressure. Z has 
wagered that Y will have high blood pressure. In a bid to help ensure he wins the bet, but 
with no real concern for Y's well being, X decided to surreptitiously interfere with Y's life in 
various ways so as to help lower Y's blood pressure, e.g. X replaces Y's unhealthy food 
with healthier alternatives.
57Quong (2011, p80), changed subjects
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In BET, X aims to promote Y's good, and so counts as holding a benevolent motive 
regarding Y according to Quong's account. But this seems implausible. Why? We will 
investigate precisely what constitutes a benevolent motive in Chapter 4, but to pre-empt 
that answer a little: X's holding a benevolent motive regarding Y, seems to require more 
than that X aims to promote Y's good. It seems to also require that X takes promoting Y's 
good as an end worthy of pursuit, apart from whatever other ends promoting Y's good 
might secure. 
In BET, this is not the case. X takes promoting Y's good to be a valuable end, solely 
because promoting Y's good will enable Y to secure another end he values (wining a bet). 
Not because he values the end of promoting Y's good for its own sake. As such, contra 
Quong, X should not count as holding a benevolent motive in this case.
iii) Challenge 3: rational persuasion and negative judgement
My third and final objection concerns Challenge 4. According to Challenge 4, an accurate 
definition of paternalism must reflect how X does not paternalise Y when he merely 
engages Y through rational persuasion. Quong argues that his second condition meets 
this challenge. But I want to suggest that Quong's claim relies on an implausible account 
of the connection between, on the one hand, X's deciding to engage Y in rational 
persuasion, and on the other hand, X's holding a 'negative judgement' regarding Y.
According to Quong's second condition, paternalism requires that X is motivated by a 
'negative judgement' regarding Y's ability to effectively make the right decision or manage 
his situation. Holding such a negative judgement, so Quong argues, is incompatible with 
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X's choosing to merely engage Y in rational persuasion. And hence, so the argument goes,
his account explains why X does not paternalise Y when he merely engages Y in rational 
persuasion (Challenge 4).
But why should we think X's engaging Y in rational persuasion necessarily precludes X 
from holding a negative judgement regarding Y's ability to effectively make the right 
decision/manage his situation? Because, so Quong argues, if X has chosen to merely 
engage Y in rational persuasion, then X must think Y will listen to rational, reasonable 
argument. And if X believes Y will listen to rational, reasonable argument, then X must hold
a non-negative judgement regarding Y's ability to effectively make the right 
decision/manage his situation. As Quong puts it, when evaluating a case of rational 
persuasion and why it could not be considered paternalist:
“she [X] would be showing respect for his [Y's] capacity to make the right decision in
the light of reasons and evidence, and thus no negative judgement would be 
implied” 58
The problem with Quong's account, is that in this instance, action and motivation are not 
connected in this necessary way. Just because X chooses to engage Y in mere rational 
persuasion, does not entail that X necessarily believes Y will listen to rational persuasion. 
For instance, imagine that X believes Y is highly unlikely to listen to reason and rational 
persuasion. Indeed, let's say that X believes the chances of rational persuasion being 
successful are something like 1 in 1000. Still, X might decide to engage Y in rational 
persuasion anyway, because he (X) is severely disabled and so has no other means of 
influencing Y available to him. X figures that engaging Y in rational persuasion is still better
58Quong (2011, p81)
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than doing nothing and simply letting Y make a disastrous decision, even if he is sceptical 
whether it will actually work. 
In fact the problem cuts both ways. Quong seems to assume that if X chooses to engage Y
through means other than rational persuasion (e.g. coercion, liberty-limiting behavior, 
deception), then unlike the case of rational persuasion, X must hold a negative judgement 
regarding Y's ability to make the right decision/manage the situation. But this isn't true 
either.
For what if X thinks Y would likely respond to rational persuasion, but also thinks that 
coercing Y will work equally well, and is in fact more expedient on the grounds that it is 
easier and less time consuming than rational persuasion? Clearly in this case X's coercive 
actions would be paternalist. Yet X seems to think that rational persuasion would work. 
And as such, on Quong's reasoning, does not hold a negative judgement regarding Y, and 
thus does not paternalise Y. But this seems an implausible conclusion.
Conclusion
What unites the accounts of paternalism developed by Charles Gert and Bernard Culver, 
and Jonathan Quong, is that both define paternalism in a somewhat unconventional way. 
Yet I have argued that these unconventional definitions fair no better at meeting the seven 
Challenges an accurate definition of paternalism must meet (or even just meeting 
Challenges 5. 6, and 7), than the conventional definitions canvassed in Chapters 1 and 2.
With the end of this chapter, comes the end of our careful analysis of the philosophical 
literature on defining paternalism. We have isolated seven 'Challenges' that an accurate 
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definition of paternalism must meet; but suggested that no account in the philosophical 
literature is able to meet these seven Challenges. In the next chapter- the final chapter of 
this thesis- I construct a new definition of paternalism that I argue meets these seven 
Challenges.
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Chapter 4: a new definition of paternalism
Introduction
At least two important lessons can be drawn from the in-depth analysis of the philosophical
literature on defining paternalism, conducted in the introduction and subsequent three 
chapters of this thesis.
First, I have suggested than an accurate definition of paternalism must meet seven 
'Challenges'. Special emphasis has been placed upon Challenges 5, 6, 7, which should be
taken together, and may in the end be the most important and most difficult of the 
Challenges to meet. Meeting these three Challenges involves reflecting how paternalism 
necessarily involves some kind of interference with Y's life (Challenge 5), while also 
reflecting the variety of different types of interference with Y's life through which X can 
paternalise Y e.g. through violating Y's liberty, deceiving Y, restricting Y's actions 
(Challenge 6), or simply through 'nudging'/'shoving' Y (Challenge 7).
Second, I have suggested, having analysed the most popular and highly regarded 
definitions of paternalism in the literature, that none of these definitions is able to meet the 
aforementioned seven Challenges. Or even just Challenges 5, 6, and 7.
In this chapter, I take one final look at each of the seven Challenges. I outline where I 
believe philosophers have gone wrong in handling these Challenges. This leads me to 
introduce a new definition of paternalism consisting of three necessary, and together 
sufficient conditions, that I argue can in fact meet the seven Challenges. I end this chapter,
and indeed the thesis as a whole, by briefly taking a look at some of the implications of this
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new definition of paternalism.
List of Challenges
Let's begin by reminding ourselves of the seven 'Challenges' an accurate definition of 
paternalism must meet.59
Challenge 1 
To reflect that paternalism necessarily involves a benevolent motive on X's
part regarding Y.
Challenge 2
That X does not paternalise Y in cases like BRIDGE where X interferes with Y 
merely because he believes Y is acting involuntarily, or in cases like ONCOMING 
TRAFFIC where X interferes with Y merely in order to ascertain if he is acting 
voluntarily or not.
Challenge 3
To reflect that X does not paternalise Y when he merely aims to engage Y in rational
persuasion. 
Challenge 4
To reflect that X does not paternalise Y in cases like BEE, CIGARETTES and 
COMA, where X has thought about what Y's relevantly informed wishes are/would 
be if Y was relevantly informed, and believes his actions to be in line with said 
relevantly informed wishes.
59As throughout the rest of this thesis, 'X' stands for the paternaliser/would-be paternaliser, while 'Y' stands 
for the paternalisee/would-be paternalisee
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The last three Challenges can be taken together.
Challenge 5
To reflect that, in some rough and ready way in need of clarification, paternalism 
requires that X aim to 'interfere with Y's life in some significant way'. As such, X 
does not paternalise Y in cases like ROSES, POSITIVE THOUGHTS, and 
LAWYER, where X does not aim to interfere with Y's life in a significant way.
Challenge 6
Following on from Challenge 5, to reflect the wide variety of interferences with Y's 
life ('nudges' and 'shoves' aside) through which X can paternalise Y. e.g. through 
violating Y's liberty, through controlling what actions Y can do, through deception, 
etc.
Challenge 7
Finally, also following on from Challenge 5, to reflect how X can interfere with Y's 
life/paternalise Y through merely 'nudging' or 'shoving' Y.
Having clarified the seven Challenges an accurate definition of paternalism must meet, let 
us, beginning with Challenge 1, take a look at where various philosophers have gone 
wrong in handling these Challenges, and how best to design one's definition in order to 
meet these Challenges.
Challenge 1
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Challenge 1 looks initially like one of the simpler Challenges to meet. In order to meet this 
Challenge, one's definition must ensure that a necessary condition of paternalism is that X 
is motivated by a genuinely benevolent concern for Y. But looks can be deceiving. In 
particular, philosophers seem to make one of two errors when trying to capture what it 
means for X to hold a benevolent motive with regards to Y. 
First, some philosophers define what it means for X to hold a benevolent motive regarding 
Y, too broadly. Jonathan Quong (2011), for instance, has argued that X has a benevolent 
motive with regards to Y whenever X aims to “improve the welfare, good, happiness, 
needs, interests, or values of agent Y”.60 While Simon Clark (2002) conceptualises a 
benevolent motive as equivalent to X's acting so as to“promote Y's good”.61 The problem 
with each of these accounts, is that they essentially equate X's having a benevolent motive
regarding Y, with X's aiming to improve/promote Y's good. But X can aim to 
improve/promote Y's good, I argue, without holding a benevolent motive with regards to Y. 
Thus, consider BET. 
BET
X has placed a bet with Z, regarding Y's blood pressure. X has wagered that when the 
doctor records Y's blood pressure next week, Y will have low blood pressure. Z has 
wagered that Y will have high blood pressure. In a bid to help ensure he wins the bet, but 
with no real concern for Y's well-being, X decides to surreptitiously interfere with Y's life in 
various ways so as to help lower Y's blood pressure. e.g. X replaces Y's unhealthy food 
with healthier alternatives,
60Quong (2011, p80), changed subjects
61Clarke (2002, p81)
84
Or consider HELPING Z:
HELPING Z
Z is a wanted outlaw. Y is a bounty collector and plans on finding and killing Z so he can 
claim the bounty. X is a close friend of Z's and does not want to see him killed. 
Accordingly, X decides to pay Y a sizable amount of money to leave Z alone.
In both BET and HELPING Z, X acts so as to promote Y's good, but without holding a 
benevolent motive with regard to Y. In the former case, X simply has a selfish motive and 
couldn't care less for Y, while in the latter case X holds a benevolent motive with regards to
another agent (Z), and only tries to benefit Y in order to protect Z. 
Second, other philosophers interpret what it means for X to be benevolently motivated 
regarding Y, too narrowly. Gerald Dworkin (2014) for instance, writes that X holds a 
benevolent motive with regards to Y, just so long as X acts:
“only because X believes Z [his actions] will improve the welfare of Y (where this 
includes preventing his welfare from diminishing), or in some way promote the 
interests, values, or good of Y” 62
The problem with this analysis, is that it implausibly assumes that in order for X to hold a 
benevolent motive with regards to Y, promoting/improving Y's good must be X's only 
reason for acting. Such an account fails to reflect a case like ALCOHOL PROBLEM.
ALCOHOL PROBLEM
62Dworkin (2014), my emphasis
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Y has a serious alcohol problem. X has a genuine concern for Y and wants X to stop 
drinking before he hurts himself one day. He also, additionally, is concerned for Y's 
partner, Z, whom he knows suffers when Y drinks. So motivated, X breaks into Y's house 
and throws away all the alcohol he can find.
In ALCOHOL PROBLEM, X clearly has a benevolent motive with regards to Y. But contra 
Dworkin, promoting Y's good is not the only reason X acts. For X is also motivated by a 
desire to promote Z's good too. 
In light of these two problems, how should we design our definition of paternalism so as 
meet Challenge 1? One thing that seems clear enough, is that X's holding a benevolent 
motive with regards to Y, involves X attempting to secure the end of promoting Y's good. 
With this in mind, I want to  draw a distinction between X's taking an end of his (e.g. 
promoting Y's good) to be valuable for its own sake, and X's taking an end of his to be 
valuable for the sake of something else. 
As I interpret these terms, X values an end of his for its own sake, when X takes securing 
that end to be valuable, irrespective of what other ends might be promoted/secured by his 
securing that end. By contrast, X takes an end of his to be valuable for the sake of 
something else, when the value of that end for X, depends on how securing that ends 
promotes/secures some other end that X values.
Thus, imagine that X in some way values the end of winning the New York marathon. X 
values this end for its own sake, just so long as X's taking this end to be valuable does not 
depend on how his winning the New York marathon will secure other ends he values e.g. 
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prize money, defeating his rival Z. By contrast, X values the end of winning the New York 
marathon for the sake of something else, when the only reason X values this end, is 
because securing it will secure other ends X values e.g. fame, fortune, defeating Z
Of course, this is not to say that X never values an end for its own sake when he believes 
securing that end promotes some other end that X values. Rather, X still counts as valuing 
the first end for its own sake, so long as X would value the first end even if securing that 
end promoted no other ends.
Why is this distinction important? Because I propose that X holds a benevolent motive with
regards to Y, when he not only values the end of promoting Y's good, but also values this 
end  for it's own sake. Thus, I suggest that we can design our definition of paternalism so 
as to meet Challenge 1, by installing the following as a necessary condition of paternalism:
'X is motivated by a desire to promote Y's interests, values, goods, etc, where this 
includes preventing these things from diminishing, and X takes promoting these things 
to be valuable for their own sake'
This description of a benevolent motive explains why X does not possess a benevolent 
motive with regards to Y in BET and HELPING Z. For in these cases, X may aim to 
promote Y's good, but the value of securing this end for X is dependent on how doing so 
promotes another end X values: in the former case winning a bet, in the latter case 
promoting Z's good. As such, in both BET and HELPING Z, X values the end of promoting 
Y's good, but only for some other reason rather than for its own sake.
87
Further, this description correctly rules that X holds a benevolent motive with regards to Y 
in ALCOHOL PROBLEM. Admittedly, in this case X thinks that securing the end of 
promoting Y's good will help promote another end he values (protecting Z). But the value 
of promoting Y's good for X, does not depend on how securing this end promotes Z's 
good. Rather, X would value promoting Y's good, even if promoting Y's good did not 
promote Z's good.
Challenge 2
This takes us to Challenge 2. However, rather than analysing how best to meet Challenge,
I instead want to leave it for now to one side; returning to it later once we have dealt with 
the rest of the seven Challenges. For as I will argue, one of the conditions we develop in 
order to meet a different Challenge, turns out to provides an effective answer to Challenge 
2.
Challenge 3
Challenge 3 is probably the most straightforward Challenge. It requires reflecting that X 
does not paternalise Y when he merely engages Y in rational persuasion. Meeting this 
Challenge is likewise relatively straightforward. For we can simply make the following a 
necessary condition of X's paternalising Y:
                 
'X does not aim to engage Y merely in rational persuasion'
Later on, I will argue that this provisional condition is actually redundant, as another 
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condition we develop in order to meet a different Challenge already precludes the 
possibility of X's paternalising Y through mere rational persuasion. Still, this condition will 
suffice for now as a temporary placeholder.
Challenge 4
If Challenge 3 was relatively simple to meet, Challenge 4 is more complicated. To recall, 
Challenge 4 involves reflecting that X's actions seem to be discounted from being 
paternalist in cases like BEE and CIGARETTES (and other relevantly similar cases like 
COMA) where X has thought about the issue, and believes relevantly informed Y 
will/would approve of his actions.
BEE
X and Y are in the park, A bee flies on Y's back with the seeming intention to sting Y. Y 
does not seem to notice the bee, but X does. Assuming that Y would not want to be stung 
if he knew there was a bee around, X decides to push Y to one side and swat away the 
bee. X acts without Y's consent for he believes there is no time to waste.
CIGARETTES
Y wants to finally quit smoking. To this end Y asks his friend X to come to his house, and 
throw away all his cigarettes. X is happy to oblige as he thinks quitting smoking will do Y 
the world of good.
I want to highlight just how difficult philosophers have found it too meet Challenge 4. Dan 
Brock (1983) argues that paternalism necessarily involves X acting in a way he takes to be
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'contrary to Y's present wishes and desires'. But this focus on Y's present wishes and 
desires is too broad; again failing to reflect that X does not paternalise Y in BEE. After all, 
at the time X pushes Y in BEE, Y presumably objects to X's behaviour.
Alternatively, Peter Suber (1999) focuses not on Y's wishes and desires, but on what Y has
consented to. Suber argues that to paternalise Y, 'is to act without Y's consent, for the 
benefit of Y'. Yet this therefore implausibly counts BEE as a case of paternalism. After all, 
X does not have Y's consent, even if he does believe that Y would approve of his actions if
he was relevantly informed.
Gert and Culver (1976) also focus on consent. They argue that in order to paternalise Y, X 
must not only act in a way he believes Y has not consented to, but also in a way he 
believes Y will not consent to in the future.63 This condition explains why X does not 
paternalise Y in CIGARETTES, because Y has already consented to X's actions, and 
explains why X does not paternalise Y in BEE, because X believes that Y will consent 
once he realises that X was protecting him from a bee sting. 
Yet Gert and Culver's condition is still too narrow, as it fails to discount X's actions from 
counting as paternalist in COMA. 
COMA
Y has fallen into a sudden and permanent coma. X, a close friend of Y's, has thought long 
and hard about the issue, and wholeheartedly believes that Y would, if he could somehow 
communicate with X, tell him to pull the plug. Because of this, X pulls the plug. X knows 
that Y has never actually given his consent; and because his actions will end Y's life, Y will
63Gert and Culver actually refer to the 'immediately forthcoming future', but for our purposes, talking about 
just the 'future' actually makes their account more plausible
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never get the chance to actually give his consent in the future.
COMA is relevantly similar to BEE and CIGARETTES, because X's actions are discounted
from being paternalist in COMA for the same reason they are discounted from being 
paternalist in BEE and CIGARETTES; because X believes he is acting in a way Y 
approves of, or at least would approve of if he was relevantly informed and able to give his
approval. But Gert and Culver's account (implausibly) rules that X paternalises Y in COMA.
After all, X has acted in a way he believes Y has not consented to, nor ever will get the 
chance to consent to. The coma was sudden so Y never had the chance to give his 
consent before; and as X's actions end Y's life, he will never get this chance in the future. 
So how do we go one better than these accounts and ensure our definition of paternalism 
meets Challenge 4? I want to suggest that paternalism necessarily involves a special kind 
of disregard on X's part: X disregards Y's relevantly informed judgement/wishes 
concerning what is in his (Y's) best interests. And that as X does not indulge in this kind of 
disregard in BEE, CIGARETTES, or COMA, this explains why X does not paternalise Y in 
these cases.
The most obvious way that X can count as engaging in this kind of disregard of Y's 
relevantly informed judgement/wishes concerning what is in his (Y's) best interests, is as 
follows: by considering what Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes are (or would be if 
Y was relevantly informed), concerning his own best interests, and nonetheless act in a 
way he knows to be contrary to these relevantly informed judgements/wishes.
When we look back at the cases of paternalism we have examined in this thesis- cases 
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like SUICIDE, CAKE, SAVING ACCOUNT, PILLS, PROFESSOR, etc - a common thread 
that runs throughout all of these cases, is that X acts like this. He acts in a way he knows 
to be contrary to (what would be) Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes concerning 
his own good. Yet by contrast, X does behave like this in BEE, CIGARETTES, or COMA. 
For in each of these cases X has thought about the issue, and believes he is acting in a 
way Y would want if he was relevantly informed.
Still, we cannot conclude just yet that X does not disregard Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes in BEE, CIGARETTES, or COMA. For there is another way X can 
engage in this kind of disregarding, and it is as follows: by failing to properly consider what 
Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes actually are or would be.64 For instance, 
consider the case of CREDIT CARD:
CREDIT CARD
X and Y are housemates. One day, as part of a promotional offer, a free credit card arrives
in the post for Y. X sees the credit card before Y, and decides to throw it away. X has a 
clean conscience so to speak, because he sincerely believes that Y would not be 
interested in the credit card anyway, and wouldn't mind X's throwing it away. However, X is
quite mistaken. And had X thought about the issue just a little bit more, he would have 
realised that Y would have been interested in a free credit card. 
In this case X may well believe his actions to be in line with Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes concerning Y's own good, but he still disregards Y's relevantly 
informed judgements/wishes anyway. This is because he has failed to give the issue his 
proper attention. As such, he is still allowing himself to disregard and ride roughshod over 
64I was made aware of this point by Dr James Wilson in private conversation (2015)
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Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes concerning his own good. Of course, this 
should not imply that X disregards Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes concerning 
his own good, anytime X makes a mistake about what Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes concerning Y's own good are. But at the very least, X must give the 
issue his proper attention and try to, so to speak, put himself in Y's shoes.
So there is a second way in which X can paternalistically disregard Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes concerning Y's own good. But X does not engage in this kind of 
disregarding in the cases of BEE, CIGARETTES, or COMA either. After all, in each of 
these cases X has really tried to consider what Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes 
are (or would be).
Along these lines, I submit that we have our answer to Challenge 4. Paternalism requires 
that X show a special kind of disregard regarding Y. This disregard can come in two forms. 
And as X engages in neither of these forms in BEE, CIGARETTES, or COMA, we have 
our explanation of why X does not paternalise Y in these cases. All that is left is for us to 
ensure our definition reflects this point, by installing the following as a necessary condition 
of paternalism
'X disregards Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes, in at least one of two ways:
Either X believes his actions are contrary to Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes, or at least what Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes 
would be if Y was relevantly informed and in a position to form judgements/wishes
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Or else, X has failed to engage in a minimally sufficient way with the issue of what 
are (or would be) Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes' 65
Before we move on to the next Challenge, it is worth very quickly preempting a worry one 
might have concerning the discussion above. It might be asked: why precisely should we 
associate the special kind of disregard involved in paternalism, with the disregarding of Y's
relevantly informed judgements/wishes, rather than just Y's judgements/wishes (as in both 
relevantly informed and non-relevantly informed judgements/wishes
The answer is simply that when Y's judgements/wishes concerning what is in his best 
interests are not relevantly informed, then in an important way those judgements/wishes 
are not truly his own. As such, X cannot be truly said to be disregarding Y's 
judgements/wishes, in a case where X merely disregards Y's non-relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes e.g. when Y's judgement is based on an ignorance of the salient facts 
that he is not aware of.66
Challenges 5, 6, and 7
This leaves us with Challenges 5, 6, and 7. These last three challenges are connected 
and, as I have suggested, the most difficult to meet. 
Challenge 5 involves reflecting how, in some sense in need of further clarification, 
65Often philosophers talk about paternalism necessarily involving a special kind of substitution, where X 
substitutes out Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes concerning what is in Y's best interests, and 
substitutes in his own. Thus, Brock (1988, p559) writes that paternalism “involves the substitution by the 
paternalistic interferer of his or her conception of what is good for another for that other's own conception of 
his or her good”.  Dworkin (1983, p107 talks of paternalism as involving the substitution of Y's “judgement”. 
While Grill (2012) and Shiffrin (2000, p218)) both refer to paternalism as involving a substitution of Y's 
“judgement or agency”. In this context, I take the notions of disregard outlined above, and this notion of 
substitution to be very similar, if not equivalent
66We will come shortly to the issue of what precisely it means, to be 'relevantly informed'
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paternalism necessarily involves X aiming to interfere with Y's life in some significant way. 
Hence, X does not paternalise Y in cases like LAWYER and ROSES where no such 
significant interference is aimed at.
Challenges 6 and 7 then involve explaining the wide variety of ways in which X can aim to 
interfere with Y's life such that he may paternalise Y (when all other conditions are met). 
Challenge 6 involves specifying all the ways in which X can paternalistically interfere with 
Y's life, other than through 'nudging' and 'shoving' Y. For Challenge 7 is dedicated to 
reflecting how X can paternalistically interfere with Y's life through merely 'nudging' or 
'shoving' Y.
Challenge 5
In attempting to meet these last three Challenges, I want to start by providing a provisional
answer to Challenge 5. That is, I suggest a provisional answer to what kind of interference 
with Y's life, is necessary for X to paternalise Y. However, I want to leave the issue of 
paternalist nudges and shoves aside for now.
With this caveat in mind, I submit that there are two ways in which X can count (nudges 
and shoves aside) as interfering with Y's life such that his actions are potentially 
paternalist. First, by restricting Y. Second, by compelling Y. 
I will come shortly to specifying precisely the various ways in which X can restrict or 
compel Y, but a quick word on what it generally means to 'restrict' or 'compel'. I take the 
notion of 'restriction', to pick out cases where X acts so as to limit what Y can do in some 
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way. For instance, X might restrict Y by preventing Y from being able to act a certain way, 
say by throwing away all of Y's chocolate bars so X cannot eat chocolate tonight. 
By contrast, I take the notion of 'compulsion' to pick out cases where X coerces Y or forces
Y to do something. For instance, X might paternalistically compel Y's actions, by force-
feeding fruits and vegetables to Y, or telling Y there is a fire that he needs to run away 
from. 
Even in this provisional form, this condition explains why X does not paternalise Y in 
ROSES, POSITIVE THOUGHTS and LAWYER. For in none of these cases does X aim to 
restrict or compel Y in any way.67 For instance, recall ROSES. 
ROSES
X grows roses in his garden, close to where his neighbour's garden starts. X does so in an
attempt to benefit Y. After all, it is nice to be able to look out of one's window and see 
beautiful roses. X knows Y has a preference that he does not do so.
Clearly in this case X neither aims to restrict or compel Y. X does not aim to prevent Y from
being able to look at the roses, nor does he force Y to look at any roses. In fact, far from 
restricting/compelling Y, X actually adds to what Y can do. For Y now has the additional 
option of being able to look out of his window and see a bed of roses if he so wishes.
Along these lines, we can contrast ROSES with, on the one hand, a paternalism case like 
COVERED GARDEN where X aims to restrict what Y can see, and on the other hand, a 
paternalism case like FORCED TO SEE where X compels Y to see something. I take it as 
67And they are 'nudge' or 'shoves' cases
96
intuitive that X paternalises Y in these cases, not in ROSES. And I suggest the reason for 
our intuitions, is that in COVERED GARDEN and FORCED TO SEE, but not in ROSES, X 
tries to restrict or compel Y.
COVERED GARDEN
X and Y are neighbours. X thinks Y is a bit of a slacker, and often notices Y spending his 
time idly looking out his window at X's beautiful garden, instead of working hard. 
Accordingly, X decides to cover up his garden with a large tarpaulin sheet, so now Y can 
no longer look at all the beautiful flowers in X's garden, and so is more inclined to do work.
FORCED TO SEE
X is once again growing roses in his garden. X believes it would greatly benefit Y to look at
his garden of roses each day, even though he knows that Y disagrees. Along these lines, 
X forces Y to look at his garden of roses each day, physically compelling him.
The provisional condition also explains why X does not paternalise Y in POSITIVE 
THOUGHTS and LAWYER. To take the former case, Y might prefer that X not send out 
positive thoughts to the universe on his behalf, but sending out positive thoughts on Y's 
behalf does not interfere with Y's life in any significant way. It neither threatens to restrict or
compel Y. At most X merely agitates Y.
Similarly, in LAWYER, X's (the daughter's) deciding not to go into law may be contrary to 
her father's (Y's) wishes, but it hardly restricts or compels. As such, X's deciding not to go 
into law is not aimed at interfering with Y's life in any way.
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Challenge 6
So as established by Challenge 5, paternalism necessarily involves some kind of 
interference with Y's life. Challenge 6 involves ensuring our definition reflects (nudges and 
shoves aside) all the ways in which X can count as interfering with Y's life. That is, it 
involves clarifying (nudges and shoves aside), through what kind of interferences with Y's 
life, X can possibly paternalise Y. e.g. how X can paternalise Y through restricting Y's 
actions, by violating Y's liberty, by deceiving Y.
Challenge 6 is probably the single most difficult Challenge to meet. Within the literature, 
attempts to meet this Challenge invariably run into at least one of the following three 
problems. First, some definitions offered within the literature are too narrow to meet 
Challenge 6; focusing too much on the more obvious cases of paternalism and overlooking
those more subtle types of paternalist interference. 
For instance, several philosophers- e.g. Arneson (1980) and Pope (2004) and Valdés 
(1990)- have suggested that (nudges and shoves aside) paternalism necessarily involves 
X aiming to coerce Y/violate Y's liberty. This might explain cases like SUICIDE and CAKE, 
but what about a case like PILLS, where X paternalises Y by refusing to tell Y where his 
sleeping pills are so that Y cannot use them to attempt to commit (rational) suicide? Or 
PROFESSOR, where a professor (X) refuses to recommend one of her PhD students (Y) 
to a certain university, because she (X) is worried the student will be out of his league, and
will therefore be unhappy? In these cases X may restrict Y from being able to act in a 
certain way, but X does not coerce Y or violate his liberty.
98
Dworkin (1983) tries to meet Challenge 6 in a different kind of way. He argues that 
paternalist acts (nudges and shoves aside) involve X preventing Y from doing as he has 
decided. But this is also too broad. For as evidenced by SAVINGS ACCOUNT from 
Chapter 2, X can paternalise Y without interfering with a decision Y has actually made.
The second kind of problem definitions of paternalism run into when encountering 
Challenge 6, is being too broad. Gert and Culver (1976) for instance, argue that in order to
paternalise Y, X must act in a way that requires moral justification. But as we saw in 
Chapter 3, this account fails to discount X's actions from being paternalist in ROSES, 
POSITIVE THOUGHTS and LAWYER. After all, in each of these cases X may well cause 
Y significant emotional pain; and such causing of pain plausibly stands in need of moral 
justification. 
Similarly, Quong argues that all cases of paternalism involve X holding a negative 
judgement regarding Y's ability to make the right decision/manage his situation. Again, this
description is too broad as X plausibly holds this kind of negative judgement in non-
paternalism cases like ROSES, POSITIVE THOUGHTS and LAWYER.
Finally, the third reason definitions have failed to meet Challenge 6, is because they are 
too vague and ambiguous. Andre and Velasquez (2011) for instance, argue that paternalist
acts involve X interfering with Y's 'freedom'. Yet what precisely these authors mean by 
'freedom' is unclear. Similarly, Clarke (2002) suggests that all acts of paternalism involve X
aiming to 'close an option' of Y's. But again, the question is, what precisely does and does 
not count as an 'option' of Y's?
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What about the provisional condition we developed in response to Challenge 5? What 
about the idea that (nudges and shoves aside) paternalist acts involve X interfering with 
Y's life, qua X aiming to restrict or compel Y? The problem with this provisional condition is
that, like Andre and Velasquez's, and Clarke's definitions, it is too vague. What we need to 
do, is to specify precisely what kinds of restrictions and compulsions are involved in 
paternalist interferences (nudges and shoves aside). So let us do just this.
It should be clear enough already that one of the ways X can interfere with Y's life such 
that his actions are potentially paternalist, is by restricting or compelling  Y's  actions.68 For 
instance recall the cases of CAKE, SUICIDE and FORCED TO SEE. In each of these 
paternalism cases X paternalises Y by coercing him. In other words, X paternalises Y by 
compelling Y to act a certain way.
Similarly, recall the paternalism cases of PROFESSOR and PILLS. In these cases X 
paternalises Y through aiming to restrict how Y can act. In the former case, X aims to stop 
Y from being able to study at a certain university; while in the latter case X aims to prevent 
Y from taking sleeping pills and committing suicide.
Yet an exclusive focus on actions is too narrow, and overlooks other, more subtle 
interferences with Y's life (nudges and shoves aside) through which X can paternalise Y. 
For instance, I submit that X can also paternalise Y through restricting/compelling what Y 
knows (or doesn't know). Consider for instance, the following case.
DEATHBED 
68De Marneffe's definition of paternalism is quite similar to this action-based proposal. According to de 
Marneffe, paternalism involves X interferging with Y qua X “deterring Y from choosing to perform an action or
by making it more difficult for Y to perform it” (2006, p73) changed subjects ('A' changed to 'Y'). As I will 
argue, this exclusive focus on actions is too narrow
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Y is on his deathbed. Y asks X how his family are. X lies to Y, telling Y that Y's family are 
all fine, even though the truth is that they were all just murdered. X lies so as to soothe Y, 
even though X knows Y wants to know the truth.
X clearly paternalises Y in DEATHBED. Yet X does not aim to restrict Y from acting in a 
certain way. After all, Y's is on his deathbed and so can't act anyway. Rather, X 
paternalises Y by restricting what Y can know (via deceiving him). 
Furthermore, X can paternalise Y by compelling Y to know something he does not want to 
know. Thus, consider a case presented by Jason Hanna (2012) I will call FORCED TO 
KNOW. 
FORCED TO KNOW
A doctor (X) paternalises a patient (Y) by forcing Y know the relevant risks involved in his 
different treatment options, even though Y has made it clear that he does not want to know
about these things. X interferes with Y in this way despite knowing that Y objects to such 
interferences, because X thinks that it is for Y's own good that he be forced to know the 
relevant risks.
So (nudges and shoves aside), X can paternalise Y through aiming to restrict or compel 
Y's actions, or by aiming to restrict or compel what Y knows (or doesn't know). Do we have
then, a description of all the types of interference with Y's life (nudges and shoves aside) 
through which X can paternalise Y? 
No. For I submit that X can also paternalise Y through restricting/compelling what Y can 
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possess (i.e. preventing Y from being able to possess something/forcing Y to possess 
something). As well as through restrictin  g/   compelling the possessions themselves (i.e. 
taking control of Y's possessions, altering them, modifying them). 
In this thesis we have already come across a case of paternalism where X paternalises Y 
through merely compelling Y to possess something; SAVINGS ACCOUNT. In this case X 
secretly sets up a savings account in Y's name, even though X knows Y would strongly 
object if he ever found out. Similarly, consider a case we might call FORCED 
KNIGHTHOOD.
FORCED KNIGHTHOOD
Y has been offered a knighthood by his country. X compels Y to accept the offer and so 
possess the title, even though X knows that Y wants to refuse the knighthood because he 
considers titles to be vain. X acts against Y's wishes because he thinks that there is much 
Y will gain from possessing a knighthood (e.g. a feeling of pride), and thinks Y will deeply 
regret refusing the knighthood in the future.
X can also paternalise Y through restricting what Y can possess. Thus, consider 
REMOVED KNIGHTHOOD where X paternalises Y by removing Y's knighthood from him 
because he believes that Y has become lazy in light of the receiving of his knighthood.
In addition to being able to paternalise Y through compelling/restricting what Y possesses, 
I submit that X can also paternalise Y through compelling the possessions themselves. 
What does it mean for X to compel a possession of Y's? 
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X can compel one of Y's possessions by damaging it, altering its form, or simply taking 
control of the possession itself. Thus, consider a case where X paternalises Y by 
remoulding a statue owned by Y, against Y's will, with the intention of making it a more 
beautiful sight for Y, all for Y's own good. In this case X does not seem to compel or restrict
Y's actions, or what Y knows. Nor does he restrict or compel Y what Y can possess. But he
does compel one of Y's possessions.
Of course, precisely what counts as something Y possesses can be a complicated issue. 
But one important possession of Y's, is plausibly Y's own body.69 Thus, I suggest that X 
can paternalise Y by merely restricting or compelling Y's body. Along these lines consider 
AIRBORNE VACCINATION; a case where X paternalises Y, by merely compelling Y's body
.
AIRBORNE VACCINATION
X knows that Y objects to receiving a certain vaccination. Still, X believes Y really should 
get vaccinated, as doing so will provide great health benefits. Along these lines, X 
surreptitiously releases an airborne vaccination, that vaccinates. This results in Y being 
vaccinated against his will.
Similarly, X can paternalise Y through restricting Y's body. For instance, X might release an
airborne substance that removes a vaccination that Y does not want removed.  
This point about how X can paternalise Y by compelling Y's possessions, throws up certain
interesting distinctions. For instance, it means that X may paternalise Y by cutting Y's hair 
while he is asleep (because this plausibly counts as a case where X compels a possession
69One might also suppose that Y owns his own identity. It would seem to follow then, that X would paternalise
Y if he was to take control (compel) Y's identity, against Y's will, for Y's own good. For instance, in a case 
where X pretends to be Y, and does good deeds
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of Y's; Y's hair). But that X does not paternalise Y if he cuts Z's hair. Similarly, it implies 
that X can paternalise Y by re-arranging Y's garden so as to beautify it without Y's 
permission, but that X does not paternalise Y if he beautifies a public garden Y 
occasionally walks through. I take these to be intuitively plausible conclusions. For while 
compelling (e.g. changing, altering) some possession of Z's, or some public good seems 
to fall short of any kind of interference with Y's life, and so cannot count as a mode of 
paternalist interference. By contrast compelling Y's possessions does seem to interfere 
with Y's life in a significant way.
So X can interfere with Y's life such that his actions are potentially paternalist, through 
restricting/compelling Y's actions, what Y knows, and what Y possesses/the possessions 
themselves. Are there any other types of interference with Y through which X can 
paternalise Y (nudges and shoves aside)? Yes, I think there are. For I submit that X can 
paternalise Y through merely aiming to restrict/compel what  thoughts  Y has. This might 
seem an unusual claim, but consider the following case.
THOUGHT REMOVAL
X paternalises his depressed friend Y, by pressing a special button that somehow stops Y 
from having certain unhappy thoughts. X interferes with Y because he is concerned for his 
friend, although he knows that Y objects strongly to his interfering in this way.
Again I think we have before us a mode of interference with Y's life through which X can 
paternalise Y, that has been entirely overlooked within the philosophical literature: thought 
restriction. Along similar lines, I submit that X can also paternalise Y by compelling Y to 
have certain thoughts. Thus consider a case we might call THOUGHT INSERTION, where 
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X presses a button that forces depressed Y to have certain happy thoughts. 
Actually, I think this focus on thoughts is itself a little too narrow. For X can also paternalise
Y by restricting or compelling Y's  sensations. For instance, X surely paternalises Y in the 
case where X prevents (restricts) Y from experiencing a certain pleasurable sensation X 
believes to be sinful. Call this PLEASURE REMOVAL. Similarly, X can paternalise Y by 
compelling Y to experience certain sensations against Y's will. For instance, X might 
paternalise Y by somehow compelling Y to experience a certain sensation X believes to be
morally praiseworthy, say a feeling of closeness to God. Call this PLEASURE INSERTION.
So X can paternalise Y by aiming to restrict/compel what thoughts Y has. And by aiming to 
restrict/compel what sensations Y experiences. To capture both these types of paternalist 
interference, let us say that X can paternalise Y by aiming to restrict or compel Y's 'mental 
episodes', where the term 'mental episodes' refers to both the various thoughts one might 
have, and to the sensations one might experience.
I suggest that we are now finally in a position to put forward a condition that can meet 
Challenge 6. It may initially sound like a grab-bag of cases; but on closer inspection it is a 
list of all the ways in which X can (nudges and shoves aside) interfere with Y's life such 
that his actions are potentially paternalist. Along these lines, I submit that a necessary 
condition of paternalism (nudges and shoves aside), is that X:
'aims to restrict or compel at least one of the following: Y's actions, what Y's knows 
(or doesn't know), what Y can possess/the possessions themselves, Y's mental 
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episodes (i.e. thoughts and feelings)'
Challenge 7
This leaves us with just Challenge 7 to meet. Challenge 7 involves reflecting how one of 
the ways in which X can interfere with Y's life such that his actions are potentially 
paternalist, is by simply 'nudging' or 'shoving' Y. 
Nudges and shoves represent a special form of paternalist interference. For rather than 
involving X restricting or compelling Y (i.e. X taking away Y's choices), nudges and shoves
involve X influencing Y's choices. As I have interpreted the terms throughout this thesis, to 
'nudge' Y, is to deliberately affect, through means other than rational persuasion, what 
choice(s) Y makes, without closing (or we might say, restricting) any of Y's options or 
forcing any option upon Y (or we might say, compelling Y). Or even exerting significant 
decisional pressure on Y's choices. A nudges exerts non-significant decisional pressure, 
when whatever influence on Y's choices a that imparts, may be potentially easily 
outweighed or neutralised by other factors (e.g. conflicting desires). Thus, a typical 
example of a paternalist nudge might be SHOPKEEPER. 
'Shoves' meanwhile, also affect, through means other than rational persuasion, what 
choice(s) Y makes without restricting Y's options or forcing any option upon Y (compelling 
Y). But they are less gentle than nudges; exerting significant decisional pressure on Y's 
choices. Thus, X 'shoves' rather than 'nudges' Y in PRICE HIKE.
SHOPKEEPER
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X (a shopkeeper) paternalistically nudges Y (a customer), by placing the more healthy 
food at the front of the shop where it is easiest to access, and the unhealthy food at the 
back of the shop where is it a little bit more difficult to access. 
PRICE HIKE
Shopkeeper X 'shoves' customer Y, by significantly increasing the the price of unhealthy 
food, in a way that does not prevent or restrict Y from buying the unhealthy food, but does 
make buying unhealthy food significantly less appealing for X.
Despite their increasing prominence in debates about paternalism and behaviour 
modification in general, paternalist nudges are often overlooked by those defining 
paternalism. Perhaps this is because they are a relatively new phenomenon, having only 
really received substantial critical attention since Thaler and Sunstein's 2008 work 'Nudge:
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness'. Alternatively, perhaps nudges 
and shoves have been often overlooked because they (especially the former) constitute a 
more subtle, arguably less morally problematic form of paternalism. Either way, it is 
noteworthy just how many accounts within the philosophical literature fail to define 
paternalism in a way that meets Challenge 7.
For instance, in Chapter 1 we saw that Arneson (1980), Pope (2004) and Valdés (1990) 
each define paternalism in terms of some kind of benevolent interference with Y's liberty. 
These accounts fail to reflect the existence of paternalist nudges and shoves, because 
paternalist nudges and shoves do not undermine Y's liberty. Similarly, Clarke (2002) 
argues that all paternalist acts involve X 'closing Y's options'. But nudges and shoves 
(especially the former) do not so much 'close' Y's options, as they do merely influence how
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attractive Y finds his options. 
Dworkin struggles to meet Challenge 7 for a different reason. For while Dworkin's two 
definitions (1983 and 2014) each adequately reflect the existence of paternalist nudges 
and shoves, it is hard to see how Dworkin can reconcile this with his more general claim 
(which underpins both accounts) that all acts of paternalism undermine Y's 'autonomy', 
where 'autonomy' refers to Y's ability to 'self-determine'. Nudges in particular, do not 
undermine Y's ability to determine his own life. For by definition, nudges are so weak that 
X is not forced to act in any way and can easily resist whatever decisional pressure they 
exert. It would therefore be more accurate to say that nudges interfere with the (perhaps 
related concept of) Y's power to make decisions in a kind of decisional vacuum free of 
benevolent influence, rather than Y's self-determination.
How then should we design our definition of paternalism so as to go one step better than 
these accounts and meet Challenge 7? As we have seen, nudges involve X affecting what 
choice Y makes, without closing any of Y's options or forcing any option upon Y. In light of 
this, it might be tempting to say that X nudges/ shoves Y, whenever X 'aims to affect what 
choice Y makes, without aiming to restrict or compel Y'. 
Actually, I don't think this is quite right. Specifically, it is too broad, for it appears to allow 
that X can nudge or shove Y through engaging Y in rational persuasion. After all, when X 
engages Y in rational persuasion, he presumably aims to affect what choice Y makes 
without aiming to restrict or compel Y. But rational persuasion is normally understood to fall
short of nudging or shoving,70 and besides our definition should not allow that X can 
paternalise Y through mere rational persuasion (see Challenge 3). Along these lines, I 
70See Hausman and Welch (2010)
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submit that the best way to meet Challenge 7, is by stipulating that X can paternalistically 
interfere with Y's life, by:
'aiming to affect (through means other than rational persuasion) what choice Y makes, 
without aiming to compel or restrict Y'
Three Points Clarified
We have very nearly arrived at our definition of paternalism. But first we need to clarify a 
few issues – three to be precise – that are lurking in the background.
First of all, note that our answer to Challenges 5 and 6 on the one hand, and our answer to
Challenge 7 on the other hand, need to be combined to form a single necessary condition. 
For taken together, our answer to these Challenges tells us precisely in what ways X can 
interfere with Y's life, such that his actions are potentially paternalist. Our answers to these
Challenges can be combined to form the following necessary condition of X's paternalising
Y:
'X aims to interfere with Y's life in at least one of two ways.
Either X aims to restrict or compel one of the following: Y's actions, what Y's 
knows (or doesn't know), what Y can possess/the possessions themselves, or Y's 
mental episodes (i.e. Y's thoughts and feelings)
Or else, X aims to affect (through means other than rational persuasion) what 
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choice Y makes, without aiming to compel or restrict Y'
The second point in need of clarification concerns Challenge 2. Earlier when we reviewed 
Challenge 2, I did not present a solution or condition designed to meet the Challenge. This
is okay, as I now want to argue that the condition we developed in order to meet Challenge
4, also ensures our condition meets Challenge 2.
To recall, Challenge 2 involves ensuring our definition discounts two kinds of cases that 
are normally thought of as cases of mere soft paternalism.71 First, an accurate definition 
should discount cases like BRIDGE from being paternalist, where X merely aims to 
interfere with Y's non-sufficiently voluntary conduct (e.g. actions, decisions, desires, etc). 
Second, an accurate definition of paternalism should discount from being paternalist, 
cases like ONCOMING TRAFFIC where benevolently motivated X tries to interfere with Y 
merely in order to ascertain whether Y's conduct (e.g. actions, decisions, desires, etc) is 
voluntary.
BRIDGE
Y is about to step onto a bridge. Little does he know that the bridge is broken and will 
collapse and kill him if he steps onto it. X knows that the bridge is broken. X sees that Y is 
walking towards the bridge, and working on the assumption that Y is unaware that the 
bridge is about to collapse and does not wish to kill himself, X decides to forcibly prevent Y
from stepping onto the bridge, say by tackling him to the ground before he gets to the 
bridge.
ONCOMING TRAFFIC
71Rather than 'hard paternalism', otherwise known as just 'paternalism', which we are trying to define in this 
thesis
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Y is about to cross the road and step into oncoming traffic. X sees this, but in unsure 
whether Y is acting involuntarily or not. After all, Y might be attempting to deliberately end 
his own life, or he may simply crossing the road absent-mindedly. X decides to forcibly 
prevent Y from crossing the road so he can quickly ascertain whether Y is acting 
voluntarily or not. If it turns out that Y is acting voluntarily, X will not stand in his way.
Usually when philosophers attempt to meet Challenge 2, they focus on the issue of 
voluntariness. They reason that X does not paternalise Y in BRIDGE, ONCOMING 
TRAFFIC and other similar cases, because X does not attempt to interfere with Y's 
voluntary actions/judgements/conduct/etc in these cases. Thus, it is common for 
philosophers to claim that whatever kind of interference with Y's life it is that paternalism 
involves, this interference must be with Y's voluntary conduct.
However, this way of meeting Challenge 2 is more problematic than it first appears.72 
Consider how, as we saw above, X can paternalise Y through benevolently 
restricting/compelling Y's mental episodes. In cases like this, it is unclear whether X 
interferes with a voluntary action/judgement/etc of Y's. At least some mental episodes 
seem to fall short of being voluntary. For instance, the feeling of sadness Y gets when his 
mind wanders to a recently deceased friend. If X was to benevolently restrict Y from being 
able to have this mental episode, despite knowing that Y does not welcome X's 
interference, then X would clearly paternalise Y. Yet such an act of paternalism seems to 
interfere with Y's merely non-voluntary mental episodes.
With this problem in mind, I suggest that the (necessary) condition we developed in order 
to meet Challenge 4, actually presents a more plausible solution to Challenge 2. That 
72This is yet another point made clear to me by Dr James Wilson in private conversation (2015)
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condition was, as follows:
'X disregards Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes/desires, in at least one 
of two ways:
'Either X believes his actions are contrary to Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes, or at least what Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes 
would be if Y was relevantly informed and in a position to form judgements/wishes.
Or else, X has failed to engage in a minimally sufficient way with the issue of 
what are (or would be) Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes'
This condition explains why X does not paternalise Y in cases like BRIDGE where X 
believes Y is acting involuntarily. For when X believes his actions are merely contrary to 
Y's involuntary judgements/wishes, it follows that X does not believe he is acting contrary 
to Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes. After all, voluntariness is surely a pre-
condition of counting as relevantly informed. Thus, assuming X has engaged with the 
issue sufficiently, his actions will not meet the condition outlined above.
Similarly, the condition above explains why X does not paternalise Y in a case like 
ONCOMING TRAFFIC. For in such a case, X does not aim to interfere with Y's relevantly 
informed judgements/wishes. On the contrary, X is interfering precisely because he does 
not know what Y's relevantly informed and voluntary judgements and wishes are. Thus, 
assuming X has engaged minimally with the issue, X's actions will not meet the the 
condition outlined above, and his actions will be (correctly) discounted from being 
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paternalist.
Furthermore, this condition correctly allows that X can paternalise Y, through 
restricting/compelling Y's mental episodes. For although in such a case X may only 
interfere with Y's non-voluntary mental episodes, X may nonetheless believe he is acting in
a way that is contrary to Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes. After all, X might be 
aware that Y has certain non-voluntary mental episodes, but prefers that no one interferes 
with them anyway.
Just before we move on to the third point of clarification, it is worth heading off a potential 
objection. The objection concerns what precisely we mean when we talk of Y's being 
'relevantly informed'. Along these lines, consider the following case.
BIG GAMBLE
Y has (fully voluntarily) decided to place a big bet on who will win the next world cup. X 
thinks the bet is a bad idea. Along these lines X goes behind Y's back and cancels the bet.
X clearly paternalises Y in BIG GAMBLE. Yet it might be claimed that the condition we 
have developed in order to meet Challenges 2 and 4, implausibly discounts X's actions in 
this case from counting as paternalist. For in BIG GAMBLE, so the argument goes, X has 
engaged with what Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes are, and has merely 
interfered with a judgement of Y's (to place a bet) that is made without knowledge of 
certain crucial facts. After all, Y does not know who will win the world cup. At best he is 
making an educated guess. 
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As such, so the argument concludes, Y's judgement is not relevantly informed in BIG 
GAMBLE. And so X's actions do not meet the demands of the condition outlined above, 
and are thus (implausibly) discounted from being paternalist according to my definition.
This criticism can be intensified by pointing out the following. Not only do we need to 
explain how Y is 'relevantly informed' in BIG GAMBLE, despite being ignorant of certain 
key facts. We simultaneously need to show, seemingly paradoxically, how Y does not 
count as relevantly informed in cases like BRIDGE where Y is similarly ignorant of certain 
key facts.
However, I think this objection can be replied to relatively straightforwardly. The key is to 
note that X need not to know all the facts, in order to count as 'relevantly informed'. Space 
does not permit a full explanation of what it means to be relevantly informed, but I submit 
that the following is a good rule of thumb: Y's judgements/wishes count as 'relevantly 
informed' regarding something, just so long as Y has accurate second order beliefs 
concerning how informed these judgements/wishes are.
Applied to BIG GAMBLE, this means that Y's judgement to make a bet can still count as 
relevantly informed even if Y is ignorant of certain facts (e.g. who will win the world cup). 
For Y recognises that he is ignorant of these facts, and thus qualifies as having accurate 
second order beliefs regarding how informed he is. This case then, can be contrasted with 
a case where Y makes a similar bet, but this time labours under the false second order 
belief that he is fully informed. Such a bet/judgement, would not count as relevantly 
informed.
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At the same time, this condition explains why Y is not relevantly informed in BRIDGE. As in
this case, Y is not only ignorant of certain facts (i.e. that the bridge is broken). Y also does 
not realise he is ignorant of these facts. Thus,Y has inaccurate second order beliefs 
concerning how informed his judgements/wishes are, and so does not count as relevantly 
informed.
The third and final point of clarification relates to Challenge 3. Recall that as a response to 
Challenge 3, we established the following as a necessary condition of X's paternalising Y:
'X does not aim to engage Y merely in rational persuasion'
However, note that the condition we developed in order to meet Challenges 5, 6, and 7, 
actually renders this condition redundant. To recall, this condition established as a 
necessary condition of X's paternalising Y, that: 
'Either X aims to restrict or compel one of the following: Y's actions, what Y's 
knows (or doesn't know), what Y can possess/the possessions themselves, or Y's 
mental episodes (thoughts and feelings)
Or else X aims to affect (through means other than rational persuasion) what 
choice Y makes, without aiming to compel or restrict Y'
Each of these types of interference with Y's life, is incompatible with rational persuasion 
anyway. After all, X cannot restrict Y, or compel Y, or affect (through means other than 
rational persuasion) what choice Y makes, while still merely engaging in rational 
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persuasion. To engage in any of these three interferences is to go beyond mere rational 
persuasion.
Our Final Definition
With these three points clarified, we are finally in a position to present our final, formalised 
definition of paternalism. I submit that X paternalises Y IFF:
1)  X is motivated by a desire to promote Y's interests, values, goods, etc, where this 
includes preventing these things from diminishing, and X takes promoting these things to 
be valuable for their own sake
2)  X aims to interfere with Y's life in at least one of two ways:
Either X aims to restrict or compel any of the following: Y's actions, what Y's 
knows (or doesn't know), what Y can possess/the possessions themselves, Y's 
mental episodes (i.e. Y's thoughts and feelings)'
Or else, X aims to affect (through means other than rational persuasion) what 
choice Y makes, without aiming to compel or restrict Y.
3)  X disregards Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes in at least one of two ways:
Either X believes his actions are contrary to Y's relevantly informed 
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judgements/wishes, or at least what Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes 
would be if Y was relevantly informed and in a position to form judgements/wishes.
Or else, X has failed to engage in a minimally sufficient way with the issue of what 
are (or would be) Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes
Implications of this definition
Paternalism then, on our new definition, consists in benevolently motivated X, aiming to 
significantly interfere with Y's life, while disregarding Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes. I want to close this chapter, and the thesis as a whole, by making a 
few brief remarks regarding to the implications of this definition. I emphasise two points.
First of all, in several significant ways, our definition of paternalism departs from how 
paternalism has been traditionally defined or conceptualised. 
To give an obvious example, we have seen that philosophers have often conceptualised 
paternalism as necessarily involving an interference with Y's liberty, or at least with how Y 
can act. But as our definition makes clear, X can in fact paternalise Y by merely 
nudging/shoving Y. Thus, in some ways, paternalism is a broader concept than has often 
been appreciated.
To give a more subtle example, even leaving aside the issue of nudges and shoves, there 
are lots of ways X can paternalise Y without restricting Y's actions or interfering with Y's 
liberty. For instance, our definitions makes clear that X can paternalise Y by preventing Y 
from learning a painful truth, or by forcing Y to know something he would rather not, or by 
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controlling what Y can possess. Thus, again, in many ways paternalism may be a broader, 
more subtle concept than has often been appreciated. 
Furthermore, our definition of paternalism also makes explicit an aspect of paternalism that
most definitions either leave as implicit, or else overlook entirely: how paternalism involves
X disregarding Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes. As such, paternalism may also 
be a narrower, perhaps more complicated concept than philosophers have often taken it to
be.
The second implication I want to draw attention to concerns our normative evaluation of 
paternalism. The question of how we ought to normatively evaluate paternalism is not the 
subject of this particular thesis. But as we have seen, in several significant ways the 
definition of paternalism offered within this thesis departs from how paternalism has 
traditionally been understood. And this clearly has implications for what kind of moral 
problems (if any) paternalism poses.
For instance, we saw above how paternalism has often been conceptualised rather too 
narrowly; overlooking the possibility of paternalist 'nudges'/'shoves', as well as more subtle
forms of interference like forcing Y to know a difficult truth, or by forcing Y to have a certain
possession he would rather he didn't possess. This conceptual oversight has normative 
implications, because these overlooked forms of paternalist interference are among the 
less morally problematic forms of paternalist interference (they are at least less morally 
problematic than act of paternalism that involve liberty-violation/act-restriction). As such, 
paternalism (at least some forms of paternalism) may well be a rather more subtle, and 
rather less morally problematic concept, than philosophers have often supposed.
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In fact, the issue cuts both ways. For another oversight common within the philosophical 
literature, is to overlook how paternalism involves X disregards Y's relevantly informed 
judgements/wishes concerning his own good. For several reasons such a disregard of Y's 
relevantly informed judgements/wishes may be interpreted as morally problematic. For 
instance, we might find such a disregard to be deeply disrespectful and infantilising. Or 
This implies that  in some ways, paternalism may be even more morally problematic than 
philosophers have supposed.
In conclusion then, despite a wide-ranging and rich philosophical literature existing on the 
issue, I have suggested that no definition within the literature seems to capture precisely 
what it means to paternalise another agent. In response to this problem I have argued that,
to express the point as simply as is consistent with being accurate, paternalism consists in 
genuinely benevolently motivated X, aiming to significantly interfere with Y's life, in a way 
that disregards Y's relevantly informed judgements/wishes.
Although this is intended to settle one debate– what precisely defines paternalism?– it 
touches upon several other important debates in philosophy. Most notably, debates 
concerning to what degree paternalism should be considered morally permissible. 
Unfortunately entering into such debates would take us beyond this particular thesis.
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